12 March, 2026

My Perspectives on the Escalating Iran-Israel-U.S. Conflict for AnewZ:

 My Perspectives on the Escalating Iran-Israel-U.S. Conflict for AnewZAnewZ:

The Myth of Iranian Collapse and the Reality of a Prolonged Conflict

The current conflict with Iran was initiated under a dangerous geopolitical delusion: the “Weakness Myth.” This narrative suggests that because Iran’s regional proxies, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, have been severely degraded since October 7, the Islamic Republic is at its lowest ebb. However, this assessment ignores historical reality and Iran’s internal resilience. While the 12-day war in June 2025 initially projected an image of Iranian restraint that some mistook for fragility, the state remains far more secure today than it was during the existential threats of the 1980s Iraq war or the chaotic internal power struggles of the post-1979 revolutionary era. With two decades of indigenous weapons development behind it, Iran is a defiant, rather than a dying, power.

The Failure of the “Quick Victory” Doctrine

The war’s progression—now entering its third week—has thoroughly debunked the promises of a “short, sweet, and quick” victory. President Trump was largely misled by “forever war advocates,” specifically Senator Lindsey Graham and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, alongside the Washington D.C. Israeli lobby. Decision-makers erroneously equated Iran with states like Venezuela, Cuba, or Afghanistan, predicting a rapid collapse.

Faced with the reality of a resilient adversary, Washington has reached a “sobering” moment. The illusions of a low-cost win have vanished, replaced by an acute awareness of how a prolonged conflict threatens global energy markets and the upcoming November U.S. elections. Consequently, the U.S. is now actively seeking an “exit ramp,” aiming to conclude hostilities after dealing significant blows to Iran’s military infrastructure.

Iran’s High-Risk Strategy of Global Pain

Iran is countering military pressure with a strategy designed to maximize international economic instability. The regime’s objective is to make the cost of war unbearable for the West by targeting energy corridors. A recent statement by top security official Ali Larijani regarding the Strait of Hormuz epitomizes this “all or no one” stance. Larijani warned that the strait would either be a path of prosperity for all or a source of “defeat and suffering” for warmongers. By broadcasting this message in six languages, Tehran signaled that if Iran is denied the use of this vital artery—which carries one-fifth of the world’s oil—then the global economy will suffer the consequences alongside them.

Domestic Stability and the “Rally Around the Flag”

Contrary to hopes of internal regime change, the conflict has triggered a “rally around the flag” effect. While many Iranians oppose the government’s policies, the vast majority—both domestically and in the diaspora—view the current strikes as a foreign invasion rather than liberation. The only notable exception is the monarchist faction, which has been marginalized for cheering the bombardment of their own country. Their vocal support for the adversary has alienated them from the domestic population, ensuring that major protest movements are unlikely to emerge in the coming months.

Escalation Risks: The Three Levers of Leverage

As the conflict persists, Iran holds three major strategic cards it has yet to fully play:

Mining the Strait of Hormuz: A move that would effectively choke global energy supplies.

The Houthi Front: Expanding the naval theater into the Gulf of Aden to stretch Western maritime resources.

Chemical Weapons: While the West has been obsessed with Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Tehran possesses a massive, sophisticated chemical weapons program.

If the regime perceives a threat of total collapse, it is highly probable they will deploy these chemical stockpiles against Israel and the Arab Gulf states. This underscores the reality that there is no “clean” victory in this theater; only a choice between a negotiated exit or a catastrophic regional escalation.

Geopolitical & Strategic Analysis

#IranAnalysis – For general geopolitical tracking.

#TehranStrategy – Focusing on the decision-making process within the Iranian leadership.

#ProxyWarMyth – Addressing the argument that Iran is not as weak as the degradation of its proxies suggests.

#StrategicDepth – Highlighting Iran’s indigenous weapons and historical resilience.

#RegionalEscalation – Covering the potential for the conflict to broaden.

#ForeverWars – Referencing the influence of lobbyists and the miscalculation of a “quick victory.”

Energy & Economic Impact

#StraitOfHormuz – The primary “choke point” mentioned by Ali Larijani.

#EnergySecurity – Highlighting the risk to 1/5th of the world’s oil supply.

#GlobalMarkets – The economic fallout of a prolonged war on the U.S. and global economies.

#OilTransit – Specifically regarding the “All or No One” stance on shipping lanes.

Domestic Iranian Politics

#RallyAroundTheFlag – Describing the internal unity often triggered by external military pressure.

#IranInternalPolitics – For discussions on the state vs. the public.

#IranianPublicOpinion – Distinguishing between the fringe “monarchist” views and the majority who oppose foreign invasion.

Escalation Risks (The “Three Points of Leverage”)

#HouthiFront – Regarding the expansion of the naval theater in the Gulf of Aden.

#ChemicalWeaponsRisk – Highlighting the “hidden” leverage Iran might use if facing total collapse.

#MaximumPressure – Analyzing the outcome of U.S. policy vs. Iranian defiance.

Policy & Diplomacy

#ExitRamp – Discussing Washington’s search for a way to end the war after initial strikes.

#DiplomaticFailure – Regarding the miscalculations comparing Iran to Venezuela or Afghanistan.

#MiddleEastCrisis2026 – To categorize the current timeline of the conflict.

The Professional Essentials

#AhmadHashemi

#GlobalPolicyInstitute

#ForeignPolicy

#StrategicStudies

#NationalSecurity

Regional Expertise

#MiddleEastAnalysis

#CentralAsia

#IranPolicy

#Geopolitics

#MENA

Academic & Intellectual Identity

#IWP (Institute of World Politics)

#HudsonInstitute

#DefenseStudies

#StrategicIntelligence

#PoliticalScience

Journalism & Media

#FreelanceJournalist

#OpEd

#InternationalRelations

#MultiLingual

#ProDemocracy

05 March, 2026

The Future of Iran and the Prospect of War

The Future of Iran and the Prospect of War

The Fall of the Dictator vs. The Collapse of the Regime

My “two cents” on the war in Iran: First and foremost, like the majority of Iranians, I am pleased the “Thug of Tehran” has fallen. Khamenei had the blood of his own people and those of the region on his hands. So, it’s great that he’s gone. However, it is incredibly naive to declare victory and believe that the demise of Khamenei equals the collapse of the regime. This regime could endure for months or even years if the U.S. is not strategic. Iran is not Iraq, Venezuela, or Afghanistan. It is a nation of over 90 million people with strong means and a resilient military despite years of sanctions. Furthermore, the religious fanatics in power have both the ideological motivation and the structural means to resist.

The Ethics of Intervention

I oppose this war because innocent people—who are already being slaughtered by their own government—will die in even greater numbers. The brutality of a regime does not automatically give foreign nations a green light to attack and kill thousands more. Approximately three out of four countries in the world are ruled by dictatorships or authoritarian regimes, and that doesn’t give permission to the U.S. to invade those countries and commit regime change. A lot of these regimes do bad things—they terrorize their own people and other people—but that doesn’t justify a U.S. invasion of the whole world only because they are authoritarian or support terrorism. Even democratic countries commit acts that result in innocent deaths, but that does not grant a license to others to invade them.

Two Potential Scenarios

When it comes to the war, I have two predictions on how it will end:

  • Scenario 1: The war ends in the near term, in a matter of a couple of days or weeks, and Iran, the U.S., and Israel all declare victory. The regime in Iran receives major blows but survives. President Trump will declare that he has destroyed the Iranian threat, and the Iranian regime will claim that it fought a war on multiple fronts against a global superpower and a regional military superpower, Israel. This in and of itself is a great victory for the regime in Iran and a strategic defeat for the U.S.
  • Scenario 2: The war is prolonged. In this case, the U.S., among other things, will try to arm and train Kurdish forces to fight in Iran. Inter-ethnic rivalries make things more complicated. For instance, Azerbaijanis and Kurds have claims on certain territories, including the West Azerbaijan province. In the initial phase, Iranian Azerbaijanis may react by siding with the regime because they are concerned about Kurdish territorial expansionism, especially in West Azerbaijan, which Kurds claim as their territory. In this scenario, the Kurds would likely pay the heaviest price in blood, only to be eventually abandoned by the U.S. and most likely even by Israel.

Meanwhile, Turkey and the Republic of Azerbaijan stand to gain the most by helping South Azerbaijan achieve autonomy. Turkey and the Republic of Azerbaijan are going to win the most in this scenario (a prolonged war). When the central government in Iran is weak enough, they will intervene to help South Azerbaijan gain its autonomy. This doesn’t necessarily mean unification of the South and the North, as the Republic of Azerbaijan does not have the capacity to annex and absorb a region with three times its population: South Azerbaijan.

The Persian heartland would bear the brunt of a prolonged war. Because the IRGC’s intelligence, infrastructure, missile facilities, and nuclear sites are concentrated there, the region would face significant civilian casualties and infrastructure damage, leading to a decline in its influence.


Strategic Goals and the Opposition

Iran has three main goals in this war:

  1. Survival. This is a survival crisis for the regime; if it can endure this war, it will emerge stronger.
  2. Preventing internal fracture and defections.
  3. Preserving deterrence capabilities, including drones and ballistic missiles.

A critical factor is who can outlast whom as ammunition depletes on all sides. Iran is playing a delicate balancing act; they are less concerned about “winning” than they are about appearing weak.

America cannot change the regime by air bombardments. If the United States wants to win in the long run, it needs a unified opposition front. To remove the current regime and bring a new system, Reza Pahlavi—who is popular in the Persian heartland—needs to be forced to create an alliance with minority groups. For that to happen, the Pahlavi movement needs to kick out the fascist “Arianist” and pro-Nazi factions. Slogans like “One nation, one language, one country, one flag” need to be banned in their gatherings. Conversely, the ethnic minorities must commit to Iran’s territorial integrity while pursuing decentralization, whether through a federal or confederal structure. Reza Pahlavi can be the King of Persia, but Persia does not equal Iran. Don’t confuse Iran with ancient Persia. Today’s Iran consists of the Persian heartland plus South Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, Al-Ahwaz, Baluchistan, and other areas.

U.S. Strategic Concerns and the Path Forward

The U.S. is concerned by three things:

  1. Political tolerance for an extended war.
  2. Oil price sensitivity leading to inflation.
  3. America’s global bandwidth and its primary interests in Latin America and East Asia.

To overthrow the regime, all constituents must participate. The Persians have the most resources; the Kurds are the best fighters; the Iranian Arabs have 90% of the oil and gas; and the Azerbaijanis have the mightiest weight in terms of population and influence. For Persians to be more active, there must be guarantees that the country will not disintegrate but will instead adopt a structure allowing non-Persian groups to practice their autonomy and preserve their language.

The U.S. must help facilitate the creation of a council of opposition forces—inclusive of all major opposition groups—to avoid civil war. The regime tries to use “divide and rule” tactics, pitting groups against each other in places like West Azerbaijan province. These ethnic ambitions must be curtailed through a coalition; otherwise, we risk a civil war that nobody wants, even if everyone wants the regime gone.

Briefly, for the U.S. and its allies to succeed, they must foster an alliance between the Persian majority and ethnic minorities. This requires several key commitments:

  • The Pahlavi Movement: Reza Pahlavi, who is popular in the Persian heartland, must distance his movement from fascist “Arianist” or ultra-nationalist factions. Slogans like “One nation, one language, one flag” must be abandoned in favor of a commitment to diversity.
  • Ethnic Minorities: Groups such as the Azerbaijanis (the second most influential group), Kurds (the most experienced fighters), and Arabs (who sit on 90% of the oil and gas) must commit to Iran’s territorial integrity.
  • A New Structure: To prevent civil war, there must be a move toward a federal or confederal structure. This would allow non-Persian groups to practice their own languages and cultures while maintaining a unified state.

Conclusion

The U.S. faces a massive test of political tolerance, oil price sensitivity, and global bandwidth. To overthrow the regime without triggering a civil war, a coalition council is essential. We must address internal nuances—such as the territorial disputes in West Azerbaijan—to ensure that the end of the regime leads to a stable, decentralized democracy rather than a fractured state of perpetual conflict, which would remain a threat to the international community.

#Iran #MiddleEast #Geopolitics #FutureOfIran #ForeignPolicy #RegimeChange

  • #Iran
  • #FutureOfIran
  • #Geopolitics
  • #MiddleEast
  • #IranTransition
  • #RegimeChange
  • #Tehran
  • #StrategicAnalysis
  • #ForeignPolicy
  • #USForeignPolicy
  • #RegionalSecurity
  • #StateBuilding
  • #ConflictResolution
  • #PoliticalStability
  • #IranianOpposition
  • #Pahlavi
  • #EthnicFederalism
  • #IranConflict
  • #DemocraticTransition
  • #WestAsia
  • #NationalUnity
  • #FutureOfIran
  • #IranAnalysis
  • #Geopolitics
  • #MiddleEastSecurity
  • #Khamenei
  • #RegimeChange
  • #NoToWar
  • #IranMinorities
  • #SouthAzerbaijan
  • #Kurdistan
  • #AlAhwaz
  • #Baluchistan
  • #FederalIran
  • #DecentralizedIran
  • #IranianDiversity
  • #RezaPahlavi
  • #IranOpposition
  • #UnitedIran
  • #IranianCoalition
  • #PersianHeartland
  • #USForeignPolicy
  • #GlobalOilPrices
  • #StrategicStability
  • #AntiWar
  • #InternalFracture












02 March, 2026

Inside politics | Azerbaijan–Iran Relations and Rising U.S. Influence in the South Caucasus - Feb 23, 2026

 Inside politics | Azerbaijan–Iran Relations and Rising U.S. Influence in the South Caucasus - Feb 23, 2026

Ahmad Hashemi, Director of the Middle East and Central Asia program at the Global Policy Institute, provides several insights regarding the evolving relationship between Azerbaijan and Iran, as well as the broader geopolitical tensions involving the U.S. and Russia. A summary of his talking points:
Azerbaijan's Strategic Ambition: Hashemi notes that Azerbaijan aims to become a central transportation hub for both East-West (China to Europe) and North-South (India/Iran to Russia) corridors. This involves a "multivector" foreign policy to secure agreements with various regional powers despite existing tensions.
Key Infrastructure Projects: He highlights the Astara-Rasht railway and bridge constructions over the Aras River as critical priorities for expanding Azerbaijan’s status as a transport and energy hub.
Iran’s Weakened Position: Hashemi argues that Iran is currently in a weakened state, particularly following recent military tensions with Israel and the U.S. in mid-2025. Consequently, Iran is forced to seek more "neighborly" and constructive relationships with countries like Azerbaijan to maintain regional stability.
The "Pariah State" Barrier: Despite lofty goals for trade expansion (such as a $10 billion target), Hashemi emphasizes that Iran's status as a heavily sanctioned "pariah state" and a sponsor of terrorism creates a significant "but" to the actual realization of these economic projects.
Risk of Mass Migration: He expresses concern that if a war between the U.S. and Iran were to become prolonged, Azerbaijan and Turkey could face a massive "exodus" of refugees, as other neighboring options like Afghanistan or Pakistan are too unstable.
U.S. vs. China Dynamics: Hashemi views the Zangezur Corridor (which he notes is sometimes called the "Trump Route" or "TRIPP") through the lens of U.S. strategy. He suggests the U.S. supports India's involvement in regional corridors specifically to curb China's global ambitions.
Skepticism Toward Russia: He remains skeptical that Russia, under President Putin, can currently act as a "constructive player" in these regional integration efforts due to its own international isolation.