Key arguments of my article for the Global Policy Institute (GPI) regarding the inevitability of regime change in Iran:

· Collapse of the Clerical-Merchant Alliance: The historic pact between the clerical establishment and the Bazaaris (merchant class) has broken down due to the plummeting rial and 60% inflation.

· Imminent Succession Crisis: The stability of the state depends on 86-year-old Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei; his failing health and eventual passing are expected to trigger an unprecedented power struggle among elites and the IRGC.

· The Security Monopoly: Despite mass protests, the regime’s survival mechanics remain intact because the security apparatus has not yet experienced a “crisis of conscience” where mid-level commanders refuse orders to fire on citizens.

· Failure of Foreign Intervention: Despite the claims of exiled Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi and other monarchists, external (U.S.–Israeli) military strikes in 2024–2025 failed to ignite a popular uprising. Instead, they triggered nationalistic “rally-round-the-flag” sentiments that allowed the regime to distract from its economic mismanagement.

· Opposition Fragmentation: While over 80% of the population rejects the Islamic Republic, the opposition remains divided; the regime actively exploits these divisions by leveraging Pahlavi supporters to prevent a unified front from forming.

· The “Periphery” vs. The “Center”: Success depends on uniting the Persian heartland with oppressed ethnic minorities—such as Azerbaijani Turks (roughly one-third of the population), Kurds, Arabs, and Baluchis—who are wary of a return to a centralized Pahlavi dictatorship supported by external powers.

· Necessity of Indigenous Leadership: Change must be bottom-up and internal; the Iranian public is increasingly skeptical of exiled “carpetbagger.” Reza Pahlavi is increasingly perceived to be an asset of foreign intelligence agencies.

Key arguments of my article for the Global Policy Institute (GPI) regarding the inevitability of regime change in Iran:

· Collapse of the Clerical-Merchant Alliance: The historic pact between the clerical establishment and the Bazaaris (merchant class) has broken down due to the plummeting rial and 60% inflation.

· Imminent Succession Crisis: The stability of the state depends on 86-year-old Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei; his failing health and eventual passing are expected to trigger an unprecedented power struggle among elites and the IRGC.

· The Security Monopoly: Despite mass protests, the regime’s survival mechanics remain intact because the security apparatus has not yet experienced a “crisis of conscience” where mid-level commanders refuse orders to fire on citizens.

· Failure of Foreign Intervention: Despite the claims of exiled Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi and other monarchists, external (U.S.–Israeli) military strikes in 2024–2025 failed to ignite a popular uprising. Instead, they triggered nationalistic “rally-round-the-flag” sentiments that allowed the regime to distract from its economic mismanagement.

· Opposition Fragmentation: While over 80% of the population rejects the Islamic Republic, the opposition remains divided; the regime actively exploits these divisions by leveraging Pahlavi supporters to prevent a unified front from forming.

· The “Periphery” vs. The “Center”: Success depends on uniting the Persian heartland with oppressed ethnic minorities—such as Azerbaijani Turks (roughly one-third of the population), Kurds, Arabs, and Baluchis—who are wary of a return to a centralized Pahlavi dictatorship supported by external powers.

· Necessity of Indigenous Leadership: Change must be bottom-up and internal; the Iranian public is increasingly skeptical of exiled “carpetbagger.” Reza Pahlavi is increasingly perceived to be an asset of foreign intelligence agencies.

Read the full analysis here: https://globalpi.org/…/irans-regime-change-is…/

Iran’s Regime Change Is Inevitable

By Ahmad Hashemi

January 2,2026

As 2025 drew to a close, the Iranian national currency, the rial, plummeted to a record low. This collapse infuriated the Bazaaris (traditional merchants and shopkeepers), triggering a return of the familiar, tragic cycle of protest and crackdown to the streets of Tehran.

The Bazaaris were historically close allies of the clergy. They bankrolled the 1979 Islamic Revolution. However, the new message from the shuttered storefronts of the Grand Bazaar is clear and quite different. The historic pact between the clerical establishment and the merchant class is broken. Nevertheless, notwithstanding this huge setback, even though the Islamic Republic appears more fragile than at any point in its 46-year history, the mechanics of regime survival remain largely intact.

For those watching from Western capitals, the temptation to view the mass street protests as a precursor to a swift, perhaps foreign-assisted, collapse, is high. However, the reality on the ground suggests a more sobering truth: regime change in Iran is not a matter of if, but how it will be carried out—and the “how” depends on internal dynamics that foreign bombs cannot ignite, and exiled voices cannot dictate.

To understand why the state can remain standing, despite 60% inflation and a severely contractionary budget that prioritizes missiles over meals, we must look past the striking images of unrest and analyze the essential requirements for a genuine transition away from the rule of the ayatollahs.

The Succession Crisis and the Security Monopoly

The most immediate catalyst for change is “biological.” The Islamic Republic’s stability relies on Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei acting as the ultimate arbiter among competing factions. The problem is that he is 86, and in poor health. His eventual passing will trigger a succession crisis without precedent.

To date, the political elites and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have maintained a veneer of unity. Even as Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf postures against President Masoud Pezeshkian, floating the threat of impeachment to distance himself from a failing Iranian economy, these “fights” remain squabbles over management, rather than fundamental splits in the system’s foundations.

For this regime to fall, the security apparatus must face a crisis of conscience. Until mid-level commanders refuse to fire on protesters —unlike recent reports of direct fire on crowds in Fasa and Hamadan— the clerical establishment’s grip on the country, with the unflinching support of the IRGC, will remain tight.

The Fallacy of Foreign Assistance

The events of October 2024 and June 2025 served as a definitive lesson for those who believed that Iran’s liberation could be aided by foreign armed intervention relying on F-35s, B-2s, or Tomahawk missiles. Contrary to exiled Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi’s assertions, (he is the son of the late Shah), U.S.–Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear and military infrastructure did not spark a popular uprising. On the contrary; they temporarily paralyzed the very opposition movements they were meant to potentially embolden.

Indeed, historical precedent suggests that in Iran external threats frequently spark a “rally-round-the-flag” sentiment. Although a majority of Iranians strongly oppose the current regime, their nationalistic pride remains a powerful force. When the country is under attack, the government is able to shift public focus away from its own mismanagement and toward the need to be united against external threats. This emotional reaction helps account for the decline in domestic protests throughout 2024 and 2025, despite these being the most economically disastrous years in the country’s history.

The Credibility Gap of the Exiled Opposition

While the regime’s domestic popularity has reached an all-time low —with surveys from the GAMAAN Institute showing over 80% rejection of the Islamic Republic— sadly the opposition remains a collection of “fragments” rather than a unified “front.” The regime does not merely observe this fragmentation. It actively cultivates it through a well-crafted strategy of sowing discord, leveraging the alleged machinations of the exiled Crown Prince, (he lives in the United States), to deepen these divides.

During all recent anti-regime protests in Iran, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi has tried to hijack the movement, asserting that he would be the best choice for Iran’s future. However, this claim faces its steepest challenge among Iran’s ethnic minorities. Azerbaijani Turks, (estimated to be about one third of the population), Kurds, Baluchis, and Arabs remember the Pahlavi era as one of discrimination, forced “Persianization,” and rigid centralization.

Pahlavi faces another problem: a lack of moral authority. Rightly or wrongly, he is increasingly perceived to be an asset of foreign intelligence agencies. By advocating for all-out foreign military intervention during the airstrikes of 2024 and 2025, Pahlavi deeply compromised his chance of getting more popular support in Iran. His alignment with foreign powers has largely discredited the monarchist movement among a populace that remains fiercely nationalistic.

The Necessity of an Indigenous, United Front

Perhaps the most significant barrier to regime change is the lack of a united, Indigenous, and inclusive opposition. In a country as diverse as Iran, a successful transition requires broad inclusion across gender, class, and ethnic lines.

If the “center”—the Persian heartland—is the heart of the protest, the “periphery”—the provinces dominated by ethnic groups—is its lifeblood. Iran is a mosaic of ethnicities, and the active

participation of these groups is a prerequisite to obtain the regime’s collapse. The governing elites mastered the art of “divide and conquer,” painting peripheral unrest as “separatism” to frighten the Persian center.

Azerbaijanis in Iran (who often refer to themselves as South Azerbaijanis) make up roughly one-third of the country’s population. While they have been relatively quiet during the most recent protest movement, they have historically played a pivotal role in contemporary Iranian politics. For a successful challenge against the current regime, Tehran (Persia) needs the support of Tabriz, the main city of the Azerbaijani large minority.

A successful revolutionary movement must bridge this gap. Unless the grievances of the urban middle class in Tehran align with the organized resistance of non-Persian provinces, the state can continue to isolate urban protests, preventing the broad geographic unrest needed to overwhelm its security forces.

The underlying anti-regime sentiment is pervasive and structural, rooted in a desire for democracy, freedom, dignity, and economic prosperity. However, the Iranian people are weary of “carpetbagger” politics from the diaspora. For these sentiments to coalesce into a genuine, bottom-up revolution, leadership must emerge from within the borders —leaders who share the daily bread lines and the smog of Tehran and Tabriz.

The Path Forward: A Broken Social Contract

The most alarming development for the Iranian regime is its historic break with the Bazaar. For decades, the Bazaaris, the relatively affluent merchant class, were the silent partners of the theocracy. Today, they are its victims. The ongoing unrest proves that the desire for fundamental change is now pervasive.

However, an absolute or quasi-absolute monarchy cannot be the future of a post-Islamic Republic of Iran. The future must be inclusive of all voices. The rise of the periphery is indispensable, proving that the struggle for a secular democracy is a shared national endeavor that will uphold and respect the rights of women, Sunnis, Jews, Azerbaijanis, and all other ethnic and religious minority groups.

The ingredients for a transition are simmering. We have an aging autocrat, an economy in shambles, and a population that has lost its fear of bullets. However, the final push will only come when the Persian center and the ethnic periphery realize they are fighting the same battle, and when the regime’s own foot soldiers realize they have more in common with the protesters than the despised clerics they are supposed to protect. Still, in the end, change in Iran will have to be indigenous, or it will not come at all.

https://globalpi.org/research/irans-regime-change-is-inevitable-but-it-cannot-be-exported/