The upcoming The Washington Outsider hashtag#Report on The Coalition – Talk Radio interview with Ahmad Hashemi confronts the Iranian regime’s post-conflict recalibration—both at home and across its regional footprint. The discussion delivers a sharp dissection of Iran’s unraveling regional posture in the wake of its direct confrontation with Israel and the cascading diplomatic fallout.
The interview opens with Australia’s decisive expulsion of Iran’s diplo-terrorists—a portmanteau now gaining traction to describe Tehran’s weaponization of diplomatic cover for covert operations. This move signals a broader shift in Canberra’s counter-interference doctrine, positioning Australia as a frontline democracy confronting transnational antisemitism and proxy intimidation.
The conversation then pivots to the global reverberations of the snapback sanctions, which have re-isolated Iran economically and politically. The regime’s attempts to frame its missile strikes on Israeli civilians as legitimate resistance are dismantled, with reference to Human Rights Watch’s rare rebuke—despite its historic anti-Israeli bias—labeling the attacks as likely war crimes. This moment marks a rupture in Tehran’s ability to manipulate international human rights discourse to shield its aggression.
Attention turns to the South Caucasus, where Iran finds itself strategically sidelined by President Trump’s participation in the Azerbaijan–Armenia peace deal and the proposed Zangezur corridor. The corridor, linking the Caspian and Black Seas, threatens to bypass Iran entirely, undermining its leverage over regional trade and transit. The interview explores how Tehran’s exclusion from this infrastructure realignment exposes its diminishing influence and deepens its strategic isolation. The corridor’s potential to foster economic interdependence between Armenia and Azerbaijan—while aligning with Western and Turkish interests—further marginalizes Iran’s role.
Throughout the program, the conversation examines how Tehran’s information warfare strategy is adapting to these setbacks. With its regional proxies under pressure and its diplomatic credibility eroding, Iran is recalibrating its propaganda apparatus to deflect blame and project strength. Yet the cracks are visible: from missile miscalculations to diplomatic expulsions, the regime’s projection strategy is faltering under the weight of its own contradictions.
This interview is not just a geopolitical postmortem—it’s a real-time autopsy of a regime losing its grip on the narrative, the region, and its relevance. But are these losses enough to bring about the collapse of the Islamic Republic – or will faltering international policies, and assistance from China, Russia, and North Korea, salvage the regime from the brink?
In the aftermath of its Twelve-Day War with Israel in June 2025, Iran’s clerical regime has arrestedhundreds of citizens accused of spying for Israel. Not all those arrested were Jewish, but Iran’s small, dwindling Jewish community has become a scapegoat. State-controlled media have accused Jewish Iranians, along with other religious and ethnic minorities, of being “Mossad mercenaries.”
Security agencies have arrested several prominent members of the Jewish community, including rabbis and cantors.
While Iran’s Jews already face discriminatory laws, the escalation with Israel has worsened their situation. They are now subject to increased surveillance, intimidation, and pressure. Iranian authorities reportedly have summoned and interrogated at least 35 Jewish citizens in Tehran and Shiraz, demanding information about their contacts with relatives in Israel.
Security agencies have arrested several prominent members of the Jewish community, including rabbis and cantors. Authorities also have conducted raids on the homes of dozens of Jewish community members. During these raids, they confiscated and checked cell phones for records of calls to Israel.
Tehran’s treatment of its Jewish population is paradoxical. On one hand, the regime brutalizes them as spies for Israel, and on the other, it exploits them for anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli propaganda and as a tool to vilify Israel. For example, Homayoun Sameyah, the Jewish representative in the Iranian parliament, has claimed that Israel’s attacks on Iran destroyed homes belonging to Iranian Jews.
In another instance, security forces allegedly forced the Anjoman-e Kalimiyan-e Iran, the official representative body of the Jewish community in Iran, to send threatening text messages to its members warning that any contact with people outside the country is “forbidden” and that community members are responsible for any social media activities, including comments, reposts, or likes related to the Twelve-Day War.
According to various reports, following Israeli strikes on Iran’s military and nuclear sites, the Islamic Republic has forced some rabbis and Jewish conscripts to participate in anti-Israel rallies, including at a rally held in Tehran’s Abrishami Synagogue, while wearing their military uniforms and kippahs. The regime also has forced them to attend public displays of loyalty to the Islamic Republic and its supreme leader, Ali Khamenei.
In using antisemitic tropes such as Jewish power and control, some Iranian officials and religious figures have even claimed that Israel has control over supernatural forces.
The twelve-day conflict with Israel has fueled a surge in antisemitism in Iran and bolstered the regime’s apocalyptic worldview. In using antisemitic tropes such as Jewish power and control, some Iranian officials and religious figures have even claimed that Israel has control over supernatural forces, and uses “Jinns and Hebrew talismans” as weapons of war. Similarly, one Shahid Beheshti University Professor claimed “New York Jewry” orchestrated the June war. He explained that Jewish real estate interests have sway over President Donald Trump.
The belief in the Mahdi, a messianic figure Twelver Shi’a believe will return to usher in a period of just and divine Islamic rule on Earth, informs Iran’s foreign policy and its relationship with Israel and the Jewish people.
This Mahdaviat belief allows no space for Israel or Jews and leads to the apocalyptic worldview that drives the Islamic Republic’s pursuit of dominance, nuclearization, and its genocidal tendency towards non-Shi’a. Yet, despite its radical ideology, realpolitik often guides the Iranian government’s actions. While Tehran’s treatment of its Jewish population will worsen, the regime is unlikely to persecute so completely that it would spark a mass exodus, for it still benefits from its ability to use Jews as living museum exhibits to maintain a facade of diversity and tolerance to both domestic and international audiences.
Some exciting personal news: I’ve joined the Global Policy Institute (GPI) in Washington, D.C., as the Director of the Middle East and Central Asia Program. I’m incredibly excited about this opportunity to contribute to a team focused on critical policy issues. This role will allow me to engage in meaningful research and policy analysis on the Middle East and Central Asia, and I look forward to making a significant impact. I’m excited to start my new role!
Iran shouldn’t count on China to boost its air force
by Ahmad Hashemi, opinion contributor - 08/08/25 10:00 AM ET
The 12-day Israeli air campaign in June was a test of technological dominance. It was a quick and massive victory for Israel and for the U.S. The war severely crippled Iran’s military, exposing critical weaknesses in its air defenses and aging air force.
Iran’s fleet of Cold War-era jets was no match for Israeli stealth fighters, allowing Israel to quickly achieve air superiority. This dominance enabled Jerusalem to decimate Iran’s military leadership and destroy key nuclear and military sites.
In response to these vulnerabilities, Tehran is now planning to acquire Chinese J-10C fighter jets to modernize its air force and reassert control over its airspace.
The Iran-Israel war also tested the limits of Iran’s alliance with Russia, which offered little more than diplomatic support to Tehran during the conflict. Despite a recently signed strategic partnership agreement and years of close cooperation, Russia’s support for Iran during this crisis has proven largely rhetorical.
Russian President Vladimir Putin condemned the U.S. attacks, describing them as “unjustified.” Putin called for dialogue without offering any military aid, claiming that Israel is almost a Russian-speaking country, much to the dismay of Iran.
Russia’s failure to deliver on a 2023 agreement for Su-35 jets and its wavering commitment to help Iran during the Iran-Israel war have led Iran to openly question Russia’s reliability as an ally.
Consequently, Tehran is now turning to China for advanced military hardware that Russia failed to provide. Iran’s weapons procurement talks with Beijing, therefore, mark a subtle but profound shift away from Moscow’s aerospace orbit, signaling a significant shift in Iran’s strategic partnerships and potentially impacting the fragile strategic balance in the region.
Iran is in high-level discussions with China to acquire up to 40 Chengdu J-10C multirole fighter jets, along with advanced air defense systems.
The J-10C — sometimes called the “Rafale Killer” after its successful engagement against French-made Indian Rafale jets in a 2025 India-Pakistan conflict — could significantly alter the regional balance of power in Iran’s favor to the detriment of Israel and Arab Gulf states.
This acquisition would be a major step in modernizing Iran’s air force, bridging the technological gap with its rivals, and potentially deterring future Israeli strikes.
Such a deal would also solidify China’s growing influence as a defense supplier in the Middle East and deepen its strategic partnership with Iran. Acquiring the J-10C jets could trigger a regional arms race, with other countries seeking to modernize their air forces to counter Iran’s new capabilities.
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other Arab Gulf neighbors are concerned about the potential transfer of Chinese jets to Iran, but Israel is worried the most. Israel is closely watching these developments and is concerned that Iran’s acquisition of these advanced jets could deter future Israeli strikes and bolster Iran’s ability to defend its airspace.
Israel seeks to halt the fighter jet deal between China and Iran. A successful deal would also cement China’s position as a major arms provider to Iran, further strengthening their strategic partnership.
Iran views the Chinese J-10C jets as a key to modernizing its almost nonexistent air force and countering Israel’s air superiority. If Iran succeeds in striking a deal, this will mark a clear strategic pivot toward China for military hardware.
Currently, China appears to be the only nation willing to supply Iran with advanced weaponry. However, Beijing is proceeding cautiously due to several factors. Past attempts by Iran to acquire J-10Cs in 2015 were thwarted by a United Nations arms embargo and China’s demand for cash payments over Iran’s proposed oil-and-gas barter.
In addition, China’s reluctance to fully commit to large-scale arms exports to Iran is rooted in its desire to avoid Western backlash and its complex relations with Iran’s regional rivals, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. These Gulf states are crucial energy suppliers and trading partners for China.
Furthermore, China prioritizes stabilizing its relationship with Washington to focus on its own technological and economic self-sufficiency, which is a more critical goal than the potential profits from selling advanced weapons to Iran.
Despite this hesitancy regarding advanced weapons sales, China is and will remain a vital ally for Iran through continued oil purchases in violation of international sanctions. More than 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports go to China, providing a crucial financial lifeline to the sanctions-stricken nation.
The arms deal is far from certain. For China, maintaining access to the Gulf’s energy resources and ensuring regional stability outweigh the benefits of supplying Iran with advanced weaponry. If unable to acquire Chinese fighter jets, Iran would be susceptible to recurring Israeli air strikes, hindering its ability to enhance its ballistic, drone, and nuclear capabilities.
The stakes are high for inaction. Washington possesses several leverages against Beijing. The U.S. is a major export market for China and contributes significantly to its GDP growth. America must use this leverage to prevent China’s potential weapons sale to Iran.
Ahmad Hashemi is a research fellow at the Hudson Institute.
Tags: Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran China, Foreign relations of Iran, Iran, Iran-Israeli tensions, Israel, J-10C fighter jets, Russia, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, United States, Vladimir Puti,n Vladimir Putin
Ahmad Hashemi, freelance analyst and graduate student at the Institute of World Politics, participated in the reform movement in Iran. He spoke to an August 4 Middle East Forum Podcast (video), and the following summarizes his comments:
The Greater Iran concept, or “Iranshahr,” refers to “the imperial nature of Iran.” The expansionist ideology “informs and influences Iran’s behavior and its domestic and foreign policies.” Historically, Iran has included a significant number of minorities. Unlike the collapsed empires that were replaced by nation-states in the twentieth century, Iran survived as a “multi-ethnic empire” due to the Pahlavi regime’s “heavy-handed military presence” in non-Persian ethnic areas that desire autonomy. Today’s Iran is a Persian empire “with a Shiite flavor.” Under the current-day fundamentalist Shiite mullahs, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and other “designated terror organizations” continue to “use violence as a means to keep the country integrated superficially.”
The one point of agreement between the Islamists and secular Persians is the Iranshahr ideology, which seeks to expand imperial Iran and revive the Persian Empire.
In the 1940s, attempts at establishing autonomous and independent areas of Iranian territory, such as South Azerbaijan and the Kurdish Republic, failed because of the bipolarity arrangements between the Soviet and American powers during the Cold War. The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran did not change the aspirations of the “pro-autonomy, pro-independence” secessionist movements in a divided country seeking equality with Persians. These movements were met with harsh regime suppression that persists today.
As a Shiite majority nation, Iran aimed to unite the non-Persian ethnic groups under the monolithic faith, but with the decline of religiosity, ethno-nationalism is on the rise among both Persians and non-Persians, creating a “serious friction point for a nation.” However, the one point of agreement between the Islamists and secular Persians is the Iranshahr ideology, which seeks to expand imperial Iran and revive the Persian Empire. Within that model, the secular nationalists differ from the Islamists in that the former want Iran to transition “from Islamist tyranny to monarchist tyranny with the Persian identity as the core idea.”
Iran is an “apartheid regime on three fronts.” First, it engages in “gender apartheid” where women are treated as inferior to men. Second, it practices “religious apartheid” where non-Shiites and non-Muslims are treated as second-class citizens. And third, it makes use of “ethnic apartheid,” wherein non-Persian minorities are marginalized “economically, politically, [and] culturally.” The opposition forces of Pahlavi monarchists refuse to acknowledge ongoing discrimination against non-Persian ethnic minorities and support the regime’s suppression of them because the monarchists consider them “a threat to Iran’s national unity and territorial integrity.”
The monarchists pay lip service in English to the idea of promoting “one nation, one flag, one country, one language,” but in Farsi they give tacit approval to the regime’s suppression of ethnic minorities. The monarchists are “opposed to any sort of expression of identity, anything other than Shiite, Persian, and a predominant identity [as] Iranian, Persian, Shiite.” This is “one reason that can explain why the opposition forces have not been able to unite against” the Islamic regime. Now that the 12-day Israel war against Iran is over, the regime has returned to “their DNA—Islamism, hostility towards secularism and towards the West, and towards Israel.”
Israel should extend outreach to the ethnic minorities because the Iranshahr doctrine “encourages coercive ‘Persianization’ of non-Persians in Iran and also territorial expansion via proxy forces abroad.”
As to Israel’s role “as it pertains to Iran today and its imperial ambitions,” the Jewish state’s public diplomacy is focused too heavily on Persian nationalists and Pahlavi monarchists. Rather, it should extend outreach to the ethnic minorities because the Iranshahr doctrine “encourages coercive ‘Persianization’ of non-Persians in Iran and also territorial expansion via proxy forces abroad.” As ethnic minorities are pro-Western, pro-Israel, and pro-Jewish, they are the “solution for future Iran.”
Three steps to end imperial Iran include: (1) empowerment of the ethnic minorities to fight the war with the Iranian regime through “local boots on the ground”; (2) the territorial collapse that would result from ethnic minorities’ taking the fight to the regime; (3) implementation of a no-fly zone in minority regions. The recent Druze model in Syria, where Israeli air support enabled the Druze minority to prevent a potential massacre by the Muslim majority, can be replicated in Iran.
The deterrence of Iran’s continued nuclear proliferation involves employing the multiple tools of U.S. national power: “maximum economic pressure, airstrikes, kinetic and non-kinetic warfare.” Additionally, although the combined soft power of the U.S. and Israel squeezes the regime via “coercive diplomacy, hybrid war, [and] cyber-attacks,” defeating the Persian empire and its Iranshahr ideology “requires a long-term strategy by the U.S., by Israel, by the West. It requires an unwavering commitment to support the militant uprising of oppressed ethnic groups” by funding, training, equipping, and arming non-ethnic Persian groups who “would overwhelm the regime.” These three steps “will be the beginning of the end of the Imperial Persian, or Iranshahr project.”
My take on the need for pressure from the neighboring countries to squeeze the regime in Iran:
Dissident Ahmad Hashemi concurred: “Squeezing Iran requires immediate neighbors, and Azerbaijan is an immediate neighbor willing to help. Azerbaijan holds major leverage over Iran. First of all, Azerbaijan is Iran’s gateway to Europe. Also, Iran has a significant Azerbaijani population, which is another lever Azerbaijan has against the regime in Tehran. Another leverage is Azerbaijan’s ties with Israel, which permit them to be in the strategic position that they are in. For this reason, Azerbaijan is an important ally in dismantling the Iranian regime, and this geopolitical asset needs to be taken seriously and exploited in countering the Iranian regime.”
Iran’s ‘North Korea moment’ might happen via smaller, covert nuclear sites
Unable to compete with the military superiority of Israel and the United States, Tehran now has more reasons to build bombs, not less.
Ahmad Hashemi Ahmad Hashemi is a research fellow at the Hudson Institute.
(July 9, 2025 / JNS) Israel’s 12-day war, followed by U.S. President Donald Trump’s historic decision to launch American strikes against Iran’s nuclear sites, struck a significant blow to Iran’s nuclear proliferation efforts.
Having lost its skies to Israel, Iran has become vulnerable to arbitrary Israeli airstrikes and might feel the urgency to double down on advancing its nuclear program. Iran’s nuclear capabilities have been crushed as a result of last month’s war, but the regime’s desire for a nuclear bomb persists. Iran has spent billions of dollars and decades of effort on its nuclear program and cannot give up on it. The only option left to survive is to build nuclear bombs.
Unable to compete with the military superiority of Israel and the United States, Tehran now has more reasons to build bombs, not less. While its progress has been dealt a significant blow, it doesn’t have to start from scratch. Its scientists retain their technical know-how, and the regime has the capability to rebuild its program over time, especially if it chooses to go dark and secretive.
Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, 86, is an avid reader of history. He knows well what happened to Ukraine, Libya, Iraq and Syria when they were forced to give up on their nuclear ambitions or, in the case of Ukraine, when it surrendered its nuclear weapons. Before the June war, Khamenei pursued a policy of strategic patience, trying to wait out Trump’s second term while looking for a perfect time to declare its “North Korea moment.” However, now that his regime’s survival is under question and he is hiding in an unspecified underground bunker out of fear for his life, he might decide to go for the nuclear option.
The Iranian regime may also have taken steps to remove equipment and material from its enrichment facilities before the American attacks against three nuclear facilities: Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan. If Iran still has access to some of its stockpile of more than 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium—uranium enriched to 60%, which is weapon usable—then direct use of that material may suddenly appear to its leaders as the most attractive and fastest pathway to a bomb.
Given that Iran’s major sites have been damaged—if not fully destroyed—it may turn to smaller-sized and more secretive, diversified and dispersed nuclear programs to defy air campaigns. There are some legitimate concerns about whether it already has covert weaponization research and enrichment sites. Further, Iran had announced in early June that it had built and would activate a third enrichment site. This would make it much more difficult to detect Iran’s future nuclear program because Tehran could try to rebuild covertly, especially if it decides not to cooperate with inspectors associated with the U.N. nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Iran’s parliament approved a bill on June 25 to suspend cooperation with the IAEA. A week later, on July 2, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian ratified the legislation.
If Iran were to follow North Korea’s example and begin to produce nuclear weapons, with or without withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the nuclear domino effect would be felt in the region and beyond. Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey would follow suit.
A nuclear Iran would be an existential threat to Israel. A nuclear Iran would be the end of NPT and other nonproliferation arrangements. Arab states, led by Egypt, have long complained that Israel remains outside the NPT treaty and have decried what they consider a “double standard” in the treatment of Israel’s nuclear program. A nuclear Iran would give the Arab states an excuse to go nuclear.
The implications of this nuclear arms race would not be limited to the Middle East. Japan and South Korea might try to acquire nuclear weapons to deter North Korea.
The stakes are high for inaction. If they notice any sign of nuclear activities in Iran, the United States and Israel would need to resume airstrikes to prevent Iran from rebuilding its capabilities for producing nuclear weapons, especially before Iran can restore its shattered aerial defenses. Only a full pause on enrichment and the resumption of IAEA inspectors’ activities can deny Iran a North Korea moment.
Citing my The Hill article, Iran's leading English language newspaper hashtag#Tehran_Times, which is run by the regime's main propagandist body, "the Islamic Ideology Dissemination Organization", has warned that any attack on Iran will be a deadly miscalculation.
In this newsletter from Hudson’s Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East, Research Fellow Ahmad Hashemi gives a look beyond the mainstream discourse on Iran. For the latest important and revealing developments from the country, subscribe here.
Resistance Axis
News about the Iran-led proxy network in the Middle East that Tehran calls the “Resistance Axis.”
A Second Hezbollah
Iran boasts about the Houthis’ increasing the cost of Israel’s war in Gaza and pressuring the Biden administration to push for a permanent ceasefire. Take the newspaper Jam-e Jam’s January 17 article, for instance. The paper, which is published by the State Radio and Television Organization, claims that the Houthis have extended their unbroken eight-year track record of victory against Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and their Western supporters by making the Red Sea unsafe for Iran’s enemies. “The Houthis have humiliated America and created panic in Israel,” the article states.
Why it matters. Through the Houthis, Iran is reproducing the successful example of Hezbollah, which has acted as Iran’s top proxy and main asset in deterring potential Israeli strikes against Iranian nuclear sites. The Houthis have advanced their capabilities to a point where they can obstruct supply chains and shipping to pressure the West to mediate a truce in Gaza.
Hajji Washington
Developments in Iran-US relations. In 1889, Iran appointed Hajji Hossein-Gholi Khan Noori, also known as Hajji Washington, to be its first ambassador to the United States.
Biden Will Not Hit Targets in Iran
The January 28 killing of three US troops in Jordan in a drone attack by Iran-backed Iraqi militants has sparked debates among the Iranians inside and outside the country about whether the US will respond by striking targets in Iran. The consensus among Iranian experts and social media users is that the attack in Jordan sought mainly to increase the pressure on the Biden administration, which will in turn force Israel to end the war in Gaza. Most Iranians also agree that the upcoming 2024 presidential election restrains President Joe Biden from taking any major military action inside Iran, fearing escalation.
Sussex University lecturer Kamran Matin predicted on February 1 that the Biden administration would deliberately delay its response to give the Iranian forces a chance to leave their bases in Iraq and Syria and not suffer casualties. Otherwise, the administration believes, Iran will be forced to respond, America will retaliate again, and the cycle will escalate into a wider war. Matin’s prediction proved correct. The Biden administration waited four days, until February 2, to carry out retaliatory strikes on targets in Iraq and Syria. Additionally, Iran had a chance to pull its senior IRGC forces from Syria on February 1, one day before the US took retaliatory actions.
Matin is not a lone voice. Mohammad Ali Jannatkhah, a conservative media personality in Iran, opined that there is no possibility of a direct US-Iran confrontation for at least one year. For the Biden administration, cordial relations with Iran are so desirable and important—and the stakes are so high—that Washington will not risk escalation. According to Jannatkhah, US strikes would target Iran-led proxies but not Iran itself. Yet others believe that the Biden team is under huge pressure from Congress, even from fellow Democrats, to hit targets inside Iran.
Some American analysts who are routinely sympathetic to the Iranian government warned about any threat of escalation and prescribed a diplomacy-only approach. In an appearance on BBC Persian Service on January 28, International Crisis Group Iran Project Director Ali Vaez stated that he saw no advantages for the US in resorting to military force. To back his argument, Vaez produced a specious statistic, claiming that after former President Donald Trump took down top Iranian general Qasem Soleimani, the State Department reported a 400 percent increase in Iran’s proxy attacks against American targets. Vaez erroneously argues that absorbing the blows from Iran is the only viable option.
Why it matters. US deterrence has eroded. Ali Khamenei assumes that America is either incapable or unwilling to respond to Iranian aggression in a way that truly punishes Iran. He can rely on a stable of Western analysts to amplify the theme that Iran’s rise is inevitable and American and allied resistance is futile.
Love Triangle
Issues pertaining to the alliance of convenience among Ali Khamenei’s Iran, Xi Jinping’s China, and Vladimir Putin’s Russia.
Iran, The Hague, and the Pax Sinica
Following South Africa’s accusation of genocide against Israel before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Iran expressed disappointment at Russia’s and China’s stances. On January 12, Hamshahri, a newspaper owned by the Tehran municipality, called their positions “strange.” The paper complained that, while China and Russia are adamant supporters of the Palestinian cause in rhetoric, they are not among the countries supporting South Africa’s official complaint.
Other state media outlets, however, have argued that Iran, Russia, and China have greatly benefitted from the conflict in Gaza, and that the United States is the biggest loser. A report published on January 7 by the regime’s official media outlet, the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), claims that Beijing’s position as an impartial mediator in the Gaza conflict has grown in significance, and that China’s influence in West Asia is increasing. China hopes to strengthen its position in the region by weakening America’s strategic influence through an Iran-backed peace initiative called the Pax Sinica.
Why it matters. The Islamic Republic has a talent for compartmentalization. On the one hand, it celebrates its alliance with Beijing and Moscow to counter the US-led international order. On the other hand, Tehran openly acknowledges disagreements among the three countries. This underscores that the Triangle Alliance is based more on convenience than any deeper alignment
Iran and Israel
The latest on the ongoing 40-year shadow war between the Islamic Republic and the Jewish state.
Lose to Palestine!
While Iranian sports teams are barred from competing against their Israeli counterparts, the Islamic Republic encourages competition with Palestinian teams. Yet Iran frowns upon the idea of its teams and athletes winning any game against Palestinians. Winning against the official underdogs violates the dictates of chivalry, the Islamic Republic believes. Therefore, when Iran beat Palestine 4–1 in the Asian Cup Group C opener on January 14, some hardliners protested. Ironically, some players on the Palestinian team have dual Israeli citizenship, and of course, some of them play in the Israeli Football League. These players’ Israeli citizenship technically disqualifies Iranian teams from playing against them.
Soccer has always been political in revolutionary Iran, and never more than when Iran hosts Palestinian teams. In October 2011, the Iranian soccer team hosted the Palestinian team and defeated it 7–0. Hossein Shariatmadari, managing editor of the supreme leader’s mouthpiece publication Kayhan, objected. He deemed the Palestinian players “under the oppression of Israel,” and argued that scoring goals against them was nothing to rejoice about.
Why it matters. While the regime encourages its athletes to lose to Palestinians, the Iranian people and national teams reject the official ideology. They prefer to win.
Iran vs. Aniran
Developments in Tehran’s relations with Aniran, the ethnolinguistic slur Iranians use to describe non-Iranian peoples—mainly Turks and Arabs—who live in and around the Islamic Republic.
Is Turkey Stealing Iran’s Clouds?
Over the past two months, photos have been circulating showing contrasting weather conditions in Turkey and Iran. While Turkey has cloudy skies and snow-covered mountaintops, there appears to be nothing but empty skies and dry mountains just across the border in Iran. Why?
One theory is that Turkey is stealing Iran’s clouds and manipulating weather patterns to divert rain clouds away from Iran. Such claims are not new. In 2018, an Iranian official accused Iran’s foreign enemies, mainly Israel, of manipulating the weather to create a drought.
Why it matters. These conspiracy theories serve two serious political purposes. First, they absolve the Iranian regime of responsibility for the fact that its poor environmental policies are causing lakes and rivers to dry up. Second, the theories tarnish the image of feared enemies. The largest lake in Iran, Lake Urmia, has been shrinking for more than a decade, primarily because of excessive dam construction. Importantly, the lake is in Iranian Azerbaijan, adjacent to Iran’s border with Turkey. Azerbaijan and Turkey are not just military allies; they are also closely related ethnically, with mutually intelligible languages. Lake Urmia’s evaporation has led to serious discontent among the Azerbaijanis of Iran, who make up between 20 and 30 percent of the country’s population and feel a strong bond of kinship with both Azerbaijanis and Turks. Iran therefore is eager to distort Turkey’s positive image among Iranian Azerbaijanis by claiming that Turkey is responsible for the environmental disaster.
The Streets of Tehran
The most debated news, issues, and topics of amusement among Iranians.
Amir-Abdollahian’s English
Iranians are mocking Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian after he tripped over basic words during a speech in English at a United Nations Security Council meeting on the situation in Gaza. The video of the speech has gone viral in Iran.
Many Iranians say they feel embarrassed by the incident. Some social media users called Amir-Abdollahian a source of disgrace on the global stage. Others joked that his area of expertise was murder rather than English. Voice of America Persian Service’s former lead presenter, Jamshid Chalangi, sarcastically pleaded with the foreign minister to have mercy and not slaughter the English language. Chalangi was alluding to Iran’s recent execution of political prisoners, which occurred as the foreign minister was welcomed in New York for his UN speech. Khalilullah Baluchi, an ethnic Baluch activist, compared Amir-Abdollahian’s English fluency with that of an elderly street vendor from the impoverished, Sunni-dominated Sistan and Baluchestan Province. However, hardline supporters of the regime have defended Amir-Abdollahian, saying that a foreign minister should not necessarily be judged by his knowledge of foreign languages.
Why it matters. In the Islamic Republic’s personnel decisions, loyalty to the regime trumps professionalism. This is what Iranians are implying on social media when they make fun of its top diplomat: that the only people who can climb the socioeconomic ladder are flatterers and lackeys. Amir-Abdollahian has ascended quickly through the ranks of the Iranian political elite, having been an affiliate of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Iranians see this as evidence of his fealty to the regime rather than his competence as a foreign minister.
Beyt Update
News about the Beyt, the Arabic word for house, which refers to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s office and official residence.
Khamenei’s Mar-a-Lago: “The King’s Garden”
Ali Khamenei, the 84-year-old supreme leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, is from Mashhad, Iran’s second-largest holy city, in the northeastern province of Khorasan. Every year, Khamenei returns to Mashhad for Nowruz, Iran’s new year celebration, which starts on March 21 and lasts almost two weeks. During Nowruz, he resides in the Bagh-e Malek (meaning “king’s garden”), the location of a palace that formerly belonged to Iran’s last king, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.
Most members of Khamenei’s extended family have parted ways with him due to political differences. Those relatives who have not cut ties with the supreme leader visit him at the King’s Garden each Nowruz. A Russian S-300 advanced surface-to-air missile defense system is reportedly stationed in Mashhad for Khamenei’s protection.
Why it matters. Iranian state media works hard to depict the supreme leader as a humble, personable, and accessible leader who should serve as a fatherly role model for citizens. In truth, however, Iranians do not buy it. Khamenei spends his yearly holiday in seclusion at an expropriated residence still known as the King’s Garden, protected by Russian air defense systems, with relatives who are clearly forced to act like a happy family for the cameras.
