My analysis for ‘Türkiye Today’ regarding the geopolitical shifts driven by the rise of the Turkic world:

·      Emergence of a "Third Way" Power Bloc: The Organization of Turkic States (OTS) has evolved from a cultural group into a strategic "middle-power" bloc. By fostering collective autonomy through shared investment funds, a common alphabet, and simplified customs, member states are reducing their historical dependence on Russia and China to navigate Eurasia as sovereign actors.
·      Security and the "Middle Corridor" Trade Route: The bloc is pivoting toward deep military cooperation, fueled by the success of Turkish defense technology and a desire to hedge against regional hegemons. This is paired with the development of the "Middle Corridor," a Trans-Caspian transport network that bypasses sanctioned Russian routes and avoids Chinese "debt-trap" diplomacy, positioning Turkic states as the gatekeepers of East-West trade.
·      Strategic US Alignment and Critical Minerals: Under the Trump administration, the U.S. has viewed the OTS as a vital counterweight to near-peer rivals. This includes the proposed "Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity" (TRIPP) to link Central Asia to Europe via the Zangezur Corridor, as well as a strategic focus on securing Central Asia’s vast uranium and rare earth mineral reserves to decouple supply chains from Chinese dominance.


Read the full article here:

https://www.turkiyetoday.com/opinion/turkic-pivot-how-ots-is-redrawing-geostrategic-map-of-eurasia-3211803?s=1

Turkic pivot: How OTS is redrawing geostrategic map of Eurasia

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Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (4th R), Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev (C), Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev (3rd L), Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov (2nd L), Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev (3rd R), Turkmen National Leader Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov (4th L), Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban (2nd R), Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) President Ersin Tatar (L), and OTS Secretary General Ambassador Kubanychbek Omuraliyev (R) attend the 12th Meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the Organization of Turkic States at Heydar Aliyev Congress Center in Gabala, Azerbaijan on Oct. 7, 2025. (AA Photo)

By Ahmad Hashemi

December 24, 2025 10:52 AM GMT+03:00

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The Eurasian Heartland is undergoing a silent but profound transformation, challenging the long-standing dominance of the regional hegemon, Russia.

For decades, the "Turkic World" was a concept relegated to linguistic abstraction and cultural nostalgia; today, that abstraction has morphed into a geopolitical reality.

Through the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), a new pole of power is emerging—one that seeks to navigate the pressures of Russia, China, and Iran by forging a path of collective autonomy.

The member states of the OTS—Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan—have moved past the "talking shop" phase of their development. They are now taking practical, sovereign steps to reduce their reliance on Moscow and Beijing.

This is evidenced by the implementation of shared projects: the creation of a joint investment fund, the adoption of a common Latin-based alphabet, the development of a simplified customs corridor, and, most crucially, deepening military cooperation.

This shift signals the birth of a middle-power bloc that no longer feels compelled to act as Russia’s "little brother" or a pawn in a Great Power game.

The strategic vacuum created by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent weakening of its regional influence has accelerated this trend.

Simultaneously, as China’s economic footprint expands aggressively, Central Asian nations are seeking a "third way."

The OTS provides exactly that—a framework for collective sovereignty that allows these nations to leverage their position between East and West without surrendering to a single neighboring hegemon.

This new reality is most visible in the burgeoning security dimension of the bloc. The 2020 war between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the subsequent liberation of Azerbaijani territories after over three decades of Armenian occupation served as a turning point.

It proved that Turkic military cooperation—specifically the synergy between Turkish defense technology and Azerbaijani tactical execution—could fundamentally change the facts on the ground.

Today, the proliferation of Turkish defense systems across Central Asia is not merely a matter of procurement; it is a strategic diversification of security dependencies.

By deepening defense ties with Ankara, Central Asian states are effectively hedging against a distracted Russia and an increasingly assertive China.

The OTS is transitioning into a security actor capable of addressing regional threats, fundamentally altering the security architecture of the Eurasian landmass.

Parallel to this military alignment is a massive transport and economic project: the "Middle Corridor." As the "Northern Corridor" through Russia remains fraught with sanctions and political risk, the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor) has gained strategic value.

Since gaining independence from Soviet rule, the Central Asian and Caucasian OTS member states have sought to revitalize the ancient network of trade routes known as the "Silk Road."

By investing in the ports, railways and digital infrastructure necessary to connect China to Europe via the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus, these states are positioning themselves as indispensable gatekeepers of Eurasian trade.

This integrated energy and transport network—often called the Middle Corridor—offers a strategic alternative to dependence on Moscow’s rail networks or Beijing’s "debt-trap diplomacy" within the Belt and Road Initiative.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan attends the Informal Summit of the Heads of State of the Organization of Turkic States in Budapest, Hungary on May 21, 2025. (AA Photo)

Türkiye as catalyst, not the master

At the heart of this movement sits Türkiye. Under President Erdogan, Ankara has skillfully played its "Turkic card," presenting itself as a partner that offers technological sophistication and security cooperation without the imperial baggage associated with Russia, China, or even Iran.

However, it would be a mistake to view the OTS as a unilateral tool of Turkish foreign policy. Leaders in Baku, Astana, and Tashkent are active architects of this union. For them, the organization is a tool of "multi-vector diplomacy."

It allows them to balance the giants on their borders—Russia to the north, China to the east, and Iran to the south—by anchoring themselves to a broader Turkic identity. This collective diplomatic weight allows them to wield an influence that no single South Caucasus or Central Asian nation could achieve alone.

The rise of this bloc has not gone unnoticed. Russia and China view the formation of a Turkic union within their traditional spheres of influence with growing wariness.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, meanwhile, considers Turkic integration an existential threat, given that ethnic Azerbaijanis comprise more than one-third of Iran’s population.

The West remains ambivalent. While some strategists in Washington and Brussels see the OTS as a useful counterweight to expansionism from Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran, others are wary of the independent, assertive foreign policy paths these nations might take.

Nevertheless, the OTS is no longer a peripheral cultural club; it is a central pillar of the new Eurasian order.

President Donald Trump signs a trilateral joint declaration with President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan of Armenia, Friday, August 8, 2025, in the State Dining Room. (Photo via White House)

The American interest: The 'TRIPP' and strategic minerals

Strategists such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Halford Mackinder paid close attention to the Eurasian landmass, viewing its control as the key to global dominance. Likewise, today’s statesmen cannot afford complacency.

As a rising geopolitical force, the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) offers the U.S. a vital platform for counterbalancing near-peer rivals in Eurasia. Central Asia is a landlocked region bordered by Russia to the north, China to the east, and Iran and Afghanistan to the south.

Integrating Central Asia and the broader Eurasian region into a powerhouse requires robust land connectivity.

A major proposed step in this direction is the "Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity" (TRIPP), a revised conceptualization of the Zangezur Corridor. This transportation corridor seeks to enhance regional stability and economic integration by establishing a trade link from Central Asia, through the South Caucasus, to Europe.

The success of such an initiative is contingent upon the reopening of the Zangezur Corridor—a project to which President Trump seeks to attach his name: the TRIPP.

His administration's approach to foreign policy, often characterized by coercive diplomacy and strategic unpredictability, has yielded results in negotiations between hostile parties in the past. This same approach could be applied to the Zangezur Corridor.

If materialized, the TRIPP would establish more than just a lasting peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan; it would create a seamless trade link from Central Asia to Europe, significantly reducing the Turkic states’ dependence on Russia and China.

The strategic imperative for the U.S. centers on critical minerals, a primary theater of competition with China.

Central Asia’s vast deposits—most notably Kazakhstan’s status as the global leader in uranium production and its significant rare earth reserves—offer a vital opportunity to decouple global supply chains from Chinese dominance.

To this end, President Trump has leveraged personal diplomacy with Presidents Erdogan of Türkiye and Aliyev of Azerbaijan as a cornerstone of U.S. strategy to gain a competitive advantage over Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran.

While shifting U.S. priorities leave the future of the TRIPP initiative uncertain, the Turkic world has already cemented its status as an indispensable actor in a multipolar order.

Its ascent demonstrates that a shared identity, reinforced by pragmatic security and economic ties, serves as a bulwark against the expansionist designs of revisionist powers.

https://www.turkiyetoday.com/opinion/turkic-pivot-how-ots-is-redrawing-geostrategic-map-of-eurasia-3211803?s=6

 

Iran’s Regime Change Is Inevitable

Date: January 2, 2026Author: Ahmad Hashemi0 Comments— Edit

Key arguments of my article for the Global Policy Institute (GPI) regarding the inevitability of regime change in Iran:

· Collapse of the Clerical-Merchant Alliance: The historic pact between the clerical establishment and the Bazaaris (merchant class) has broken down due to the plummeting rial and 60% inflation.

· Imminent Succession Crisis: The stability of the state depends on 86-year-old Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei; his failing health and eventual passing are expected to trigger an unprecedented power struggle among elites and the IRGC.

· The Security Monopoly: Despite mass protests, the regime’s survival mechanics remain intact because the security apparatus has not yet experienced a “crisis of conscience” where mid-level commanders refuse orders to fire on citizens.

· Failure of Foreign Intervention: Despite the claims of exiled Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi and other monarchists, external (U.S.–Israeli) military strikes in 2024–2025 failed to ignite a popular uprising. Instead, they triggered nationalistic “rally-round-the-flag” sentiments that allowed the regime to distract from its economic mismanagement.

· Opposition Fragmentation: While over 80% of the population rejects the Islamic Republic, the opposition remains divided; the regime actively exploits these divisions by leveraging Pahlavi supporters to prevent a unified front from forming.

· The “Periphery” vs. The “Center”: Success depends on uniting the Persian heartland with oppressed ethnic minorities—such as Azerbaijani Turks (roughly one-third of the population), Kurds, Arabs, and Baluchis—who are wary of a return to a centralized Pahlavi dictatorship supported by external powers.

· Necessity of Indigenous Leadership: Change must be bottom-up and internal; the Iranian public is increasingly skeptical of exiled “carpetbagger.” Reza Pahlavi is increasingly perceived to be an asset of foreign intelligence agencies.

Key arguments of my article for the Global Policy Institute (GPI) regarding the inevitability of regime change in Iran:

· Collapse of the Clerical-Merchant Alliance: The historic pact between the clerical establishment and the Bazaaris (merchant class) has broken down due to the plummeting rial and 60% inflation.

· Imminent Succession Crisis: The stability of the state depends on 86-year-old Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei; his failing health and eventual passing are expected to trigger an unprecedented power struggle among elites and the IRGC.

· The Security Monopoly: Despite mass protests, the regime’s survival mechanics remain intact because the security apparatus has not yet experienced a “crisis of conscience” where mid-level commanders refuse orders to fire on citizens.

· Failure of Foreign Intervention: Despite the claims of exiled Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi and other monarchists, external (U.S.–Israeli) military strikes in 2024–2025 failed to ignite a popular uprising. Instead, they triggered nationalistic “rally-round-the-flag” sentiments that allowed the regime to distract from its economic mismanagement.

· Opposition Fragmentation: While over 80% of the population rejects the Islamic Republic, the opposition remains divided; the regime actively exploits these divisions by leveraging Pahlavi supporters to prevent a unified front from forming.

· The “Periphery” vs. The “Center”: Success depends on uniting the Persian heartland with oppressed ethnic minorities—such as Azerbaijani Turks (roughly one-third of the population), Kurds, Arabs, and Baluchis—who are wary of a return to a centralized Pahlavi dictatorship supported by external powers.

· Necessity of Indigenous Leadership: Change must be bottom-up and internal; the Iranian public is increasingly skeptical of exiled “carpetbagger.” Reza Pahlavi is increasingly perceived to be an asset of foreign intelligence agencies.

Read the full analysis here: https://globalpi.org/…/irans-regime-change-is…/

Iran’s Regime Change Is Inevitable

By Ahmad Hashemi

January 2,2026

As 2025 drew to a close, the Iranian national currency, the rial, plummeted to a record low. This collapse infuriated the Bazaaris (traditional merchants and shopkeepers), triggering a return of the familiar, tragic cycle of protest and crackdown to the streets of Tehran.

The Bazaaris were historically close allies of the clergy. They bankrolled the 1979 Islamic Revolution. However, the new message from the shuttered storefronts of the Grand Bazaar is clear and quite different. The historic pact between the clerical establishment and the merchant class is broken. Nevertheless, notwithstanding this huge setback, even though the Islamic Republic appears more fragile than at any point in its 46-year history, the mechanics of regime survival remain largely intact.

For those watching from Western capitals, the temptation to view the mass street protests as a precursor to a swift, perhaps foreign-assisted, collapse, is high. However, the reality on the ground suggests a more sobering truth: regime change in Iran is not a matter of if, but how it will be carried out—and the “how” depends on internal dynamics that foreign bombs cannot ignite, and exiled voices cannot dictate.

To understand why the state can remain standing, despite 60% inflation and a severely contractionary budget that prioritizes missiles over meals, we must look past the striking images of unrest and analyze the essential requirements for a genuine transition away from the rule of the ayatollahs.

The Succession Crisis and the Security Monopoly

The most immediate catalyst for change is “biological.” The Islamic Republic’s stability relies on Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei acting as the ultimate arbiter among competing factions. The problem is that he is 86, and in poor health. His eventual passing will trigger a succession crisis without precedent.

To date, the political elites and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have maintained a veneer of unity. Even as Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf postures against President Masoud Pezeshkian, floating the threat of impeachment to distance himself from a failing Iranian economy, these “fights” remain squabbles over management, rather than fundamental splits in the system’s foundations.

For this regime to fall, the security apparatus must face a crisis of conscience. Until mid-level commanders refuse to fire on protesters —unlike recent reports of direct fire on crowds in Fasa and Hamadan— the clerical establishment’s grip on the country, with the unflinching support of the IRGC, will remain tight.

The Fallacy of Foreign Assistance

The events of October 2024 and June 2025 served as a definitive lesson for those who believed that Iran’s liberation could be aided by foreign armed intervention relying on F-35s, B-2s, or Tomahawk missiles. Contrary to exiled Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi’s assertions, (he is the son of the late Shah), U.S.–Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear and military infrastructure did not spark a popular uprising. On the contrary; they temporarily paralyzed the very opposition movements they were meant to potentially embolden.

Indeed, historical precedent suggests that in Iran external threats frequently spark a “rally-round-the-flag” sentiment. Although a majority of Iranians strongly oppose the current regime, their nationalistic pride remains a powerful force. When the country is under attack, the government is able to shift public focus away from its own mismanagement and toward the need to be united against external threats. This emotional reaction helps account for the decline in domestic protests throughout 2024 and 2025, despite these being the most economically disastrous years in the country’s history.

The Credibility Gap of the Exiled Opposition

While the regime’s domestic popularity has reached an all-time low —with surveys from the GAMAAN Institute showing over 80% rejection of the Islamic Republic— sadly the opposition remains a collection of “fragments” rather than a unified “front.” The regime does not merely observe this fragmentation. It actively cultivates it through a well-crafted strategy of sowing discord, leveraging the alleged machinations of the exiled Crown Prince, (he lives in the United States), to deepen these divides.

During all recent anti-regime protests in Iran, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi has tried to hijack the movement, asserting that he would be the best choice for Iran’s future. However, this claim faces its steepest challenge among Iran’s ethnic minorities. Azerbaijani Turks, (estimated to be about one third of the population), Kurds, Baluchis, and Arabs remember the Pahlavi era as one of discrimination, forced “Persianization,” and rigid centralization.

Pahlavi faces another problem: a lack of moral authority. Rightly or wrongly, he is increasingly perceived to be an asset of foreign intelligence agencies. By advocating for all-out foreign military intervention during the airstrikes of 2024 and 2025, Pahlavi deeply compromised his chance of getting more popular support in Iran. His alignment with foreign powers has largely discredited the monarchist movement among a populace that remains fiercely nationalistic.

The Necessity of an Indigenous, United Front

Perhaps the most significant barrier to regime change is the lack of a united, Indigenous, and inclusive opposition. In a country as diverse as Iran, a successful transition requires broad inclusion across gender, class, and ethnic lines.

If the “center”—the Persian heartland—is the heart of the protest, the “periphery”—the provinces dominated by ethnic groups—is its lifeblood. Iran is a mosaic of ethnicities, and the active

participation of these groups is a prerequisite to obtain the regime’s collapse. The governing elites mastered the art of “divide and conquer,” painting peripheral unrest as “separatism” to frighten the Persian center.

Azerbaijanis in Iran (who often refer to themselves as South Azerbaijanis) make up roughly one-third of the country’s population. While they have been relatively quiet during the most recent protest movement, they have historically played a pivotal role in contemporary Iranian politics. For a successful challenge against the current regime, Tehran (Persia) needs the support of Tabriz, the main city of the Azerbaijani large minority.

A successful revolutionary movement must bridge this gap. Unless the grievances of the urban middle class in Tehran align with the organized resistance of non-Persian provinces, the state can continue to isolate urban protests, preventing the broad geographic unrest needed to overwhelm its security forces.

The underlying anti-regime sentiment is pervasive and structural, rooted in a desire for democracy, freedom, dignity, and economic prosperity. However, the Iranian people are weary of “carpetbagger” politics from the diaspora. For these sentiments to coalesce into a genuine, bottom-up revolution, leadership must emerge from within the borders —leaders who share the daily bread lines and the smog of Tehran and Tabriz.

The Path Forward: A Broken Social Contract

The most alarming development for the Iranian regime is its historic break with the Bazaar. For decades, the Bazaaris, the relatively affluent merchant class, were the silent partners of the theocracy. Today, they are its victims. The ongoing unrest proves that the desire for fundamental change is now pervasive.

However, an absolute or quasi-absolute monarchy cannot be the future of a post-Islamic Republic of Iran. The future must be inclusive of all voices. The rise of the periphery is indispensable, proving that the struggle for a secular democracy is a shared national endeavor that will uphold and respect the rights of women, Sunnis, Jews, Azerbaijanis, and all other ethnic and religious minority groups.

The ingredients for a transition are simmering. We have an aging autocrat, an economy in shambles, and a population that has lost its fear of bullets. However, the final push will only come when the Persian center and the ethnic periphery realize they are fighting the same battle, and when the regime’s own foot soldiers realize they have more in common with the protesters than the despised clerics they are supposed to protect. Still, in the end, change in Iran will have to be indigenous, or it will not come at all.

https://globalpi.org/research/irans-regime-change-is-inevitable-but-it-cannot-be-exported/

 

What Does Trump’s National Security Strategy Mean for the Middle East? 

Happy New Year, everyone!

To start 2026 on a productive note, I’m leaning further into my writing. My latest piece for Global Policy Institute (GPI) explores the implications of the 2025 National Security Strategy for the Middle East.

Here is a five-point summary of my take on the 2025 NSS regarding the Middle East:

1. Shift from Nation-Building to “Calculated Retrenchment”: The strategy ends the era of ambitious American nation-building and ideological meddling. It transitions the U.S. role from “world’s policeman” to a “global sheriff,” prioritizing troop reductions and “America First” interests while maintaining the willingness to use decisive force when necessary.

2. Restored Deterrence via Military Action: The doctrine is anchored by “Peace through Strength,” specifically citing “Operation Midnight Hammer” (June 2025). These joint U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities are credited with neutralizing the nuclear threat, restoring credible deterrence, and allowing the U.S. to scale back its permanent regional footprint.

3. Prioritizing Interests Over Values: The administration has abandoned “lecturing” Arab allies on human rights, democracy, or governance. Instead, it pursues transactional diplomacy, offering security guarantees and support to non-democratic partners in exchange for burden-sharing and cooperation on shared economic and security goals.

4. “Maximum Pressure” and Economic Strangulation of Iran: Despite the degraded nuclear threat, the U.S. will maintain a policy of “economic strangulation” against Tehran. This includes aggressive targeting of the IRGC’s financial networks to prevent the rebuilding of proxy forces, viewing Iran as a manageable security issue rather than an existential crisis.

5. Strategic Reallocation of Resources: By achieving energy independence and “right-sizing” Middle Eastern threats, the U.S. aims to redirect its strategic focus and resources toward countering China in the Indo-Pacific and securing the Western Hemisphere against hostile influence and organized crime.

Here is the full text of my piece:

What Does Trump’s National Security Strategy Mean for the Middle East?

By Ahmad Hashemi

December 18,2025

The recent release of the 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) by the Trump White House signifies a pivotal shift in American foreign policy in the Middle East, viewing the region as an area for investment rather than a primary strategic focus. For too long, the United States has vacillated between the extremes of ambitious nation-building and hesitant retrenchment. This new doctrine cuts through that historical confusion with ruthless clarity, declaring that the era of the Middle East dominating American planning is over.

However, the administration makes clear that this is not a retreat akin to Biden-era withdrawals; rather, it is a calculated retrenchment accompanied by restored deterrence, stemming from the willingness to use force “if necessary”.

A new approach

The President’s strategy leverages military modernization and tactical unpredictability to enforce “Peace through Strength”. A major turning point for this policy occurred in June 2025 with “Operation Midnight Hammer,” during which combined U.S. and Israeli strikes neutralized key Iranian nuclear facilities, enabling a broader strategic recalibration. The operation underscored a central tenet of the administration’s deterrence strategy: that the threat of force must be credible and visible to be effective.

This new regional approach (the Trumpian retrenchment) is firmly rooted in the “America First” philosophy, which prioritizes strict U.S. national interests, transactional exchanges, security, and economic prosperity over ideological commitments and overstretched military presence abroad. The strategy outlines a reduction in troop levels and foreign aid while shifting the primary geopolitical focus toward countering China. It emphasizes the importance of strong sovereign nations and demands fair burden-sharing among allies, favoring transactional diplomacy over traditional, often burdensome, alliances.

Weaker Iran

The NSS explicitly credits Operation Midnight Hammer, combined with sustained Israeli military pressure since late 2023, for creating a reality where Iran is a “greatly weakened” force. The document dismisses the critics who feared direct action against Tehran would spark a regional war, noting that the strikes effectively restored credible deterrence and established a new status quo that no longer requires a massive, permanent American military footprint

Governance no longer an issue

The strategy redefines U.S. interests in the region with strict limitations: preventing an adversary from dominating Gulf energy resources, maintaining the open flow of commerce through the Strait of Hormuz, ensuring the security of Israel, and halting the export of terrorism. By relegating all other concerns to secondary status, the administration has abandoned the practice of lecturing Arab partners on governance,

human rights, democracy, and American values. The NSS reverses the dynamic that previously alienated key allies in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Cairo, promising instead to accept regional leaders and nations as they are. This approach applies a “Peace Through Strength” doctrine to diplomacy, fostering cooperation based on shared threats and shared economic interests rather than shared values, and guaranteeing protection for non-democratic friends without imposing American domestic political standards on them.

Tough on Iran

Regarding Iran, the NSS shuns diplomatic euphemisms like “re-engagement” in favor of strict enforcement. It invokes National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2) to underscore a “maximum pressure” campaign that extends beyond standard sanctions. The strategy focuses on aggressively targeting the logistical and financial networks of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to ensure Tehran cannot rebuild its proxy networks. The administration asserts that while the immediate nuclear threat was diminished by the June airstrikes, economic strangulation will persist until Tehran fully abandons its regional, missile, and nuclear ambitions.

This “right-sizing” of the Iranian threat and viewing it as a manageable security issue rather than an existential crisis in the region is the key mechanism unlocking the broader strategy. It frees up critical resources for the Indo-Pacific and allows for the implementation of the “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. For the first time in decades, the stability of the Western Hemisphere is prioritized, based on the logic that the U.S. cannot effectively compete with China globally if its own neighborhood is plagued by crime, narcotics, and hostile influence.

Relying on energy independence

Economically, the strategy leverages American energy dominance. With the U.S. established as a net energy exporter, the administration views energy independence as a weapon that insulates the American economy from Middle Eastern instability. The U.S. remains committed to securing the Strait of Hormuz not out of desperation for oil, but to prevent hostile powers from holding the global economy hostage.

Moderate engagement

Ultimately, the 2025 NSS serves as a declaration of bandwidth management. It argues that the “constant irritant” of the Middle East was fueled by excessive American meddling and insufficient resolve. The President has declared the Iranian nuclear threat “significantly degraded,” signaling the end of the “forever wars” in the Middle East. The U.S. is transitioning from the role of the world’s policeman to that of a global sheriff—one who intervenes decisively when safety is threatened but otherwise leaves nations to manage their own affairs. The message to Tehran is one of containment; to undemocratic allies, it is one of support without interference and lecturing; and to the American people, it is a promise of peace guarded by visible, credible, and lethal strength.

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Ahmad Hashemi is Director of the Middle East and Central Asia Program at the Global Policy Institute, a naturalized U.S. citizen and former Iranian Foreign Ministry official, journalist, and pro-democracy activist.

He holds advanced degrees in political science, defense, and strategic studies, is pursuing an MA in Strategic Intelligence Studies, and has published widely in major international outlets in multiple languages.

https://globalpi.org/research/what-does-trumps-national-security-strategy-mean-for-the-middle-east/

https://globalpi.org/research/what-does-trumps-national-security-strategy-mean-for-the-middle-east/