Iran shouldn’t count on China to boost its air force
by Ahmad Hashemi, opinion contributor - 08/08/25 10:00 AM ET
The 12-day Israeli air campaign in June was a test of technological dominance. It was a quick and massive victory for Israel and for the U.S. The war severely crippled Iran’s military, exposing critical weaknesses in its air defenses and aging air force.
Iran’s fleet of Cold War-era jets was no match for Israeli stealth fighters, allowing Israel to quickly achieve air superiority. This dominance enabled Jerusalem to decimate Iran’s military leadership and destroy key nuclear and military sites.
In response to these vulnerabilities, Tehran is now planning to acquire Chinese J-10C fighter jets to modernize its air force and reassert control over its airspace.
The Iran-Israel war also tested the limits of Iran’s alliance with Russia, which offered little more than diplomatic support to Tehran during the conflict. Despite a recently signed strategic partnership agreement and years of close cooperation, Russia’s support for Iran during this crisis has proven largely rhetorical.
Russian President Vladimir Putin condemned the U.S. attacks, describing them as “unjustified.” Putin called for dialogue without offering any military aid, claiming that Israel is almost a Russian-speaking country, much to the dismay of Iran.
Russia’s failure to deliver on a 2023 agreement for Su-35 jets and its wavering commitment to help Iran during the Iran-Israel war have led Iran to openly question Russia’s reliability as an ally.
Consequently, Tehran is now turning to China for advanced military hardware that Russia failed to provide. Iran’s weapons procurement talks with Beijing, therefore, mark a subtle but profound shift away from Moscow’s aerospace orbit, signaling a significant shift in Iran’s strategic partnerships and potentially impacting the fragile strategic balance in the region.
Iran is in high-level discussions with China to acquire up to 40 Chengdu J-10C multirole fighter jets, along with advanced air defense systems.
The J-10C — sometimes called the “Rafale Killer” after its successful engagement against French-made Indian Rafale jets in a 2025 India-Pakistan conflict — could significantly alter the regional balance of power in Iran’s favor to the detriment of Israel and Arab Gulf states.
This acquisition would be a major step in modernizing Iran’s air force, bridging the technological gap with its rivals, and potentially deterring future Israeli strikes.
Such a deal would also solidify China’s growing influence as a defense supplier in the Middle East and deepen its strategic partnership with Iran. Acquiring the J-10C jets could trigger a regional arms race, with other countries seeking to modernize their air forces to counter Iran’s new capabilities.
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other Arab Gulf neighbors are concerned about the potential transfer of Chinese jets to Iran, but Israel is worried the most. Israel is closely watching these developments and is concerned that Iran’s acquisition of these advanced jets could deter future Israeli strikes and bolster Iran’s ability to defend its airspace.
Israel seeks to halt the fighter jet deal between China and Iran. A successful deal would also cement China’s position as a major arms provider to Iran, further strengthening their strategic partnership.
Iran views the Chinese J-10C jets as a key to modernizing its almost nonexistent air force and countering Israel’s air superiority. If Iran succeeds in striking a deal, this will mark a clear strategic pivot toward China for military hardware.
Currently, China appears to be the only nation willing to supply Iran with advanced weaponry. However, Beijing is proceeding cautiously due to several factors. Past attempts by Iran to acquire J-10Cs in 2015 were thwarted by a United Nations arms embargo and China’s demand for cash payments over Iran’s proposed oil-and-gas barter.
In addition, China’s reluctance to fully commit to large-scale arms exports to Iran is rooted in its desire to avoid Western backlash and its complex relations with Iran’s regional rivals, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. These Gulf states are crucial energy suppliers and trading partners for China.
Furthermore, China prioritizes stabilizing its relationship with Washington to focus on its own technological and economic self-sufficiency, which is a more critical goal than the potential profits from selling advanced weapons to Iran.
Despite this hesitancy regarding advanced weapons sales, China is and will remain a vital ally for Iran through continued oil purchases in violation of international sanctions. More than 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports go to China, providing a crucial financial lifeline to the sanctions-stricken nation.
The arms deal is far from certain. For China, maintaining access to the Gulf’s energy resources and ensuring regional stability outweigh the benefits of supplying Iran with advanced weaponry. If unable to acquire Chinese fighter jets, Iran would be susceptible to recurring Israeli air strikes, hindering its ability to enhance its ballistic, drone, and nuclear capabilities.
The stakes are high for inaction. Washington possesses several leverages against Beijing. The U.S. is a major export market for China and contributes significantly to its GDP growth. America must use this leverage to prevent China’s potential weapons sale to Iran.
Ahmad Hashemi is a research fellow at the Hudson Institute.
Tags: Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran China, Foreign relations of Iran, Iran, Iran-Israeli tensions, Israel, J-10C fighter jets, Russia, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, United States, Vladimir Puti,n Vladimir Putin
Ahmad Hashemi, freelance analyst and graduate student at the Institute of World Politics, participated in the reform movement in Iran. He spoke to an August 4 Middle East Forum Podcast (video), and the following summarizes his comments:
The Greater Iran concept, or “Iranshahr,” refers to “the imperial nature of Iran.” The expansionist ideology “informs and influences Iran’s behavior and its domestic and foreign policies.” Historically, Iran has included a significant number of minorities. Unlike the collapsed empires that were replaced by nation-states in the twentieth century, Iran survived as a “multi-ethnic empire” due to the Pahlavi regime’s “heavy-handed military presence” in non-Persian ethnic areas that desire autonomy. Today’s Iran is a Persian empire “with a Shiite flavor.” Under the current-day fundamentalist Shiite mullahs, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and other “designated terror organizations” continue to “use violence as a means to keep the country integrated superficially.”
The one point of agreement between the Islamists and secular Persians is the Iranshahr ideology, which seeks to expand imperial Iran and revive the Persian Empire.
In the 1940s, attempts at establishing autonomous and independent areas of Iranian territory, such as South Azerbaijan and the Kurdish Republic, failed because of the bipolarity arrangements between the Soviet and American powers during the Cold War. The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran did not change the aspirations of the “pro-autonomy, pro-independence” secessionist movements in a divided country seeking equality with Persians. These movements were met with harsh regime suppression that persists today.
As a Shiite majority nation, Iran aimed to unite the non-Persian ethnic groups under the monolithic faith, but with the decline of religiosity, ethno-nationalism is on the rise among both Persians and non-Persians, creating a “serious friction point for a nation.” However, the one point of agreement between the Islamists and secular Persians is the Iranshahr ideology, which seeks to expand imperial Iran and revive the Persian Empire. Within that model, the secular nationalists differ from the Islamists in that the former want Iran to transition “from Islamist tyranny to monarchist tyranny with the Persian identity as the core idea.”
Iran is an “apartheid regime on three fronts.” First, it engages in “gender apartheid” where women are treated as inferior to men. Second, it practices “religious apartheid” where non-Shiites and non-Muslims are treated as second-class citizens. And third, it makes use of “ethnic apartheid,” wherein non-Persian minorities are marginalized “economically, politically, [and] culturally.” The opposition forces of Pahlavi monarchists refuse to acknowledge ongoing discrimination against non-Persian ethnic minorities and support the regime’s suppression of them because the monarchists consider them “a threat to Iran’s national unity and territorial integrity.”
The monarchists pay lip service in English to the idea of promoting “one nation, one flag, one country, one language,” but in Farsi they give tacit approval to the regime’s suppression of ethnic minorities. The monarchists are “opposed to any sort of expression of identity, anything other than Shiite, Persian, and a predominant identity [as] Iranian, Persian, Shiite.” This is “one reason that can explain why the opposition forces have not been able to unite against” the Islamic regime. Now that the 12-day Israel war against Iran is over, the regime has returned to “their DNA—Islamism, hostility towards secularism and towards the West, and towards Israel.”
Israel should extend outreach to the ethnic minorities because the Iranshahr doctrine “encourages coercive ‘Persianization’ of non-Persians in Iran and also territorial expansion via proxy forces abroad.”
As to Israel’s role “as it pertains to Iran today and its imperial ambitions,” the Jewish state’s public diplomacy is focused too heavily on Persian nationalists and Pahlavi monarchists. Rather, it should extend outreach to the ethnic minorities because the Iranshahr doctrine “encourages coercive ‘Persianization’ of non-Persians in Iran and also territorial expansion via proxy forces abroad.” As ethnic minorities are pro-Western, pro-Israel, and pro-Jewish, they are the “solution for future Iran.”
Three steps to end imperial Iran include: (1) empowerment of the ethnic minorities to fight the war with the Iranian regime through “local boots on the ground”; (2) the territorial collapse that would result from ethnic minorities’ taking the fight to the regime; (3) implementation of a no-fly zone in minority regions. The recent Druze model in Syria, where Israeli air support enabled the Druze minority to prevent a potential massacre by the Muslim majority, can be replicated in Iran.
The deterrence of Iran’s continued nuclear proliferation involves employing the multiple tools of U.S. national power: “maximum economic pressure, airstrikes, kinetic and non-kinetic warfare.” Additionally, although the combined soft power of the U.S. and Israel squeezes the regime via “coercive diplomacy, hybrid war, [and] cyber-attacks,” defeating the Persian empire and its Iranshahr ideology “requires a long-term strategy by the U.S., by Israel, by the West. It requires an unwavering commitment to support the militant uprising of oppressed ethnic groups” by funding, training, equipping, and arming non-ethnic Persian groups who “would overwhelm the regime.” These three steps “will be the beginning of the end of the Imperial Persian, or Iranshahr project.”
My take on the need for pressure from the neighboring countries to squeeze the regime in Iran:
Dissident Ahmad Hashemi concurred: “Squeezing Iran requires immediate neighbors, and Azerbaijan is an immediate neighbor willing to help. Azerbaijan holds major leverage over Iran. First of all, Azerbaijan is Iran’s gateway to Europe. Also, Iran has a significant Azerbaijani population, which is another lever Azerbaijan has against the regime in Tehran. Another leverage is Azerbaijan’s ties with Israel, which permit them to be in the strategic position that they are in. For this reason, Azerbaijan is an important ally in dismantling the Iranian regime, and this geopolitical asset needs to be taken seriously and exploited in countering the Iranian regime.”
Iran’s ‘North Korea moment’ might happen via smaller, covert nuclear sites
Unable to compete with the military superiority of Israel and the United States, Tehran now has more reasons to build bombs, not less.
Ahmad Hashemi Ahmad Hashemi is a research fellow at the Hudson Institute.
(July 9, 2025 / JNS) Israel’s 12-day war, followed by U.S. President Donald Trump’s historic decision to launch American strikes against Iran’s nuclear sites, struck a significant blow to Iran’s nuclear proliferation efforts.
Having lost its skies to Israel, Iran has become vulnerable to arbitrary Israeli airstrikes and might feel the urgency to double down on advancing its nuclear program. Iran’s nuclear capabilities have been crushed as a result of last month’s war, but the regime’s desire for a nuclear bomb persists. Iran has spent billions of dollars and decades of effort on its nuclear program and cannot give up on it. The only option left to survive is to build nuclear bombs.
Unable to compete with the military superiority of Israel and the United States, Tehran now has more reasons to build bombs, not less. While its progress has been dealt a significant blow, it doesn’t have to start from scratch. Its scientists retain their technical know-how, and the regime has the capability to rebuild its program over time, especially if it chooses to go dark and secretive.
Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, 86, is an avid reader of history. He knows well what happened to Ukraine, Libya, Iraq and Syria when they were forced to give up on their nuclear ambitions or, in the case of Ukraine, when it surrendered its nuclear weapons. Before the June war, Khamenei pursued a policy of strategic patience, trying to wait out Trump’s second term while looking for a perfect time to declare its “North Korea moment.” However, now that his regime’s survival is under question and he is hiding in an unspecified underground bunker out of fear for his life, he might decide to go for the nuclear option.
The Iranian regime may also have taken steps to remove equipment and material from its enrichment facilities before the American attacks against three nuclear facilities: Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan. If Iran still has access to some of its stockpile of more than 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium—uranium enriched to 60%, which is weapon usable—then direct use of that material may suddenly appear to its leaders as the most attractive and fastest pathway to a bomb.
Given that Iran’s major sites have been damaged—if not fully destroyed—it may turn to smaller-sized and more secretive, diversified and dispersed nuclear programs to defy air campaigns. There are some legitimate concerns about whether it already has covert weaponization research and enrichment sites. Further, Iran had announced in early June that it had built and would activate a third enrichment site. This would make it much more difficult to detect Iran’s future nuclear program because Tehran could try to rebuild covertly, especially if it decides not to cooperate with inspectors associated with the U.N. nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Iran’s parliament approved a bill on June 25 to suspend cooperation with the IAEA. A week later, on July 2, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian ratified the legislation.
If Iran were to follow North Korea’s example and begin to produce nuclear weapons, with or without withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the nuclear domino effect would be felt in the region and beyond. Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey would follow suit.
A nuclear Iran would be an existential threat to Israel. A nuclear Iran would be the end of NPT and other nonproliferation arrangements. Arab states, led by Egypt, have long complained that Israel remains outside the NPT treaty and have decried what they consider a “double standard” in the treatment of Israel’s nuclear program. A nuclear Iran would give the Arab states an excuse to go nuclear.
The implications of this nuclear arms race would not be limited to the Middle East. Japan and South Korea might try to acquire nuclear weapons to deter North Korea.
The stakes are high for inaction. If they notice any sign of nuclear activities in Iran, the United States and Israel would need to resume airstrikes to prevent Iran from rebuilding its capabilities for producing nuclear weapons, especially before Iran can restore its shattered aerial defenses. Only a full pause on enrichment and the resumption of IAEA inspectors’ activities can deny Iran a North Korea moment.
Citing my The Hill article, Iran's leading English language newspaper hashtag#Tehran_Times, which is run by the regime's main propagandist body, "the Islamic Ideology Dissemination Organization", has warned that any attack on Iran will be a deadly miscalculation.
In this newsletter from Hudson’s Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East, Research Fellow Ahmad Hashemi gives a look beyond the mainstream discourse on Iran. For the latest important and revealing developments from the country, subscribe here.
Resistance Axis
News about the Iran-led proxy network in the Middle East that Tehran calls the “Resistance Axis.”
A Second Hezbollah
Iran boasts about the Houthis’ increasing the cost of Israel’s war in Gaza and pressuring the Biden administration to push for a permanent ceasefire. Take the newspaper Jam-e Jam’s January 17 article, for instance. The paper, which is published by the State Radio and Television Organization, claims that the Houthis have extended their unbroken eight-year track record of victory against Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and their Western supporters by making the Red Sea unsafe for Iran’s enemies. “The Houthis have humiliated America and created panic in Israel,” the article states.
Why it matters. Through the Houthis, Iran is reproducing the successful example of Hezbollah, which has acted as Iran’s top proxy and main asset in deterring potential Israeli strikes against Iranian nuclear sites. The Houthis have advanced their capabilities to a point where they can obstruct supply chains and shipping to pressure the West to mediate a truce in Gaza.
Hajji Washington
Developments in Iran-US relations. In 1889, Iran appointed Hajji Hossein-Gholi Khan Noori, also known as Hajji Washington, to be its first ambassador to the United States.
Biden Will Not Hit Targets in Iran
The January 28 killing of three US troops in Jordan in a drone attack by Iran-backed Iraqi militants has sparked debates among the Iranians inside and outside the country about whether the US will respond by striking targets in Iran. The consensus among Iranian experts and social media users is that the attack in Jordan sought mainly to increase the pressure on the Biden administration, which will in turn force Israel to end the war in Gaza. Most Iranians also agree that the upcoming 2024 presidential election restrains President Joe Biden from taking any major military action inside Iran, fearing escalation.
Sussex University lecturer Kamran Matin predicted on February 1 that the Biden administration would deliberately delay its response to give the Iranian forces a chance to leave their bases in Iraq and Syria and not suffer casualties. Otherwise, the administration believes, Iran will be forced to respond, America will retaliate again, and the cycle will escalate into a wider war. Matin’s prediction proved correct. The Biden administration waited four days, until February 2, to carry out retaliatory strikes on targets in Iraq and Syria. Additionally, Iran had a chance to pull its senior IRGC forces from Syria on February 1, one day before the US took retaliatory actions.
Matin is not a lone voice. Mohammad Ali Jannatkhah, a conservative media personality in Iran, opined that there is no possibility of a direct US-Iran confrontation for at least one year. For the Biden administration, cordial relations with Iran are so desirable and important—and the stakes are so high—that Washington will not risk escalation. According to Jannatkhah, US strikes would target Iran-led proxies but not Iran itself. Yet others believe that the Biden team is under huge pressure from Congress, even from fellow Democrats, to hit targets inside Iran.
Some American analysts who are routinely sympathetic to the Iranian government warned about any threat of escalation and prescribed a diplomacy-only approach. In an appearance on BBC Persian Service on January 28, International Crisis Group Iran Project Director Ali Vaez stated that he saw no advantages for the US in resorting to military force. To back his argument, Vaez produced a specious statistic, claiming that after former President Donald Trump took down top Iranian general Qasem Soleimani, the State Department reported a 400 percent increase in Iran’s proxy attacks against American targets. Vaez erroneously argues that absorbing the blows from Iran is the only viable option.
Why it matters. US deterrence has eroded. Ali Khamenei assumes that America is either incapable or unwilling to respond to Iranian aggression in a way that truly punishes Iran. He can rely on a stable of Western analysts to amplify the theme that Iran’s rise is inevitable and American and allied resistance is futile.
Love Triangle
Issues pertaining to the alliance of convenience among Ali Khamenei’s Iran, Xi Jinping’s China, and Vladimir Putin’s Russia.
Iran, The Hague, and the Pax Sinica
Following South Africa’s accusation of genocide against Israel before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Iran expressed disappointment at Russia’s and China’s stances. On January 12, Hamshahri, a newspaper owned by the Tehran municipality, called their positions “strange.” The paper complained that, while China and Russia are adamant supporters of the Palestinian cause in rhetoric, they are not among the countries supporting South Africa’s official complaint.
Other state media outlets, however, have argued that Iran, Russia, and China have greatly benefitted from the conflict in Gaza, and that the United States is the biggest loser. A report published on January 7 by the regime’s official media outlet, the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), claims that Beijing’s position as an impartial mediator in the Gaza conflict has grown in significance, and that China’s influence in West Asia is increasing. China hopes to strengthen its position in the region by weakening America’s strategic influence through an Iran-backed peace initiative called the Pax Sinica.
Why it matters. The Islamic Republic has a talent for compartmentalization. On the one hand, it celebrates its alliance with Beijing and Moscow to counter the US-led international order. On the other hand, Tehran openly acknowledges disagreements among the three countries. This underscores that the Triangle Alliance is based more on convenience than any deeper alignment
Iran and Israel
The latest on the ongoing 40-year shadow war between the Islamic Republic and the Jewish state.
Lose to Palestine!
While Iranian sports teams are barred from competing against their Israeli counterparts, the Islamic Republic encourages competition with Palestinian teams. Yet Iran frowns upon the idea of its teams and athletes winning any game against Palestinians. Winning against the official underdogs violates the dictates of chivalry, the Islamic Republic believes. Therefore, when Iran beat Palestine 4–1 in the Asian Cup Group C opener on January 14, some hardliners protested. Ironically, some players on the Palestinian team have dual Israeli citizenship, and of course, some of them play in the Israeli Football League. These players’ Israeli citizenship technically disqualifies Iranian teams from playing against them.
Soccer has always been political in revolutionary Iran, and never more than when Iran hosts Palestinian teams. In October 2011, the Iranian soccer team hosted the Palestinian team and defeated it 7–0. Hossein Shariatmadari, managing editor of the supreme leader’s mouthpiece publication Kayhan, objected. He deemed the Palestinian players “under the oppression of Israel,” and argued that scoring goals against them was nothing to rejoice about.
Why it matters. While the regime encourages its athletes to lose to Palestinians, the Iranian people and national teams reject the official ideology. They prefer to win.
Iran vs. Aniran
Developments in Tehran’s relations with Aniran, the ethnolinguistic slur Iranians use to describe non-Iranian peoples—mainly Turks and Arabs—who live in and around the Islamic Republic.
Is Turkey Stealing Iran’s Clouds?
Over the past two months, photos have been circulating showing contrasting weather conditions in Turkey and Iran. While Turkey has cloudy skies and snow-covered mountaintops, there appears to be nothing but empty skies and dry mountains just across the border in Iran. Why?
One theory is that Turkey is stealing Iran’s clouds and manipulating weather patterns to divert rain clouds away from Iran. Such claims are not new. In 2018, an Iranian official accused Iran’s foreign enemies, mainly Israel, of manipulating the weather to create a drought.
Why it matters. These conspiracy theories serve two serious political purposes. First, they absolve the Iranian regime of responsibility for the fact that its poor environmental policies are causing lakes and rivers to dry up. Second, the theories tarnish the image of feared enemies. The largest lake in Iran, Lake Urmia, has been shrinking for more than a decade, primarily because of excessive dam construction. Importantly, the lake is in Iranian Azerbaijan, adjacent to Iran’s border with Turkey. Azerbaijan and Turkey are not just military allies; they are also closely related ethnically, with mutually intelligible languages. Lake Urmia’s evaporation has led to serious discontent among the Azerbaijanis of Iran, who make up between 20 and 30 percent of the country’s population and feel a strong bond of kinship with both Azerbaijanis and Turks. Iran therefore is eager to distort Turkey’s positive image among Iranian Azerbaijanis by claiming that Turkey is responsible for the environmental disaster.
The Streets of Tehran
The most debated news, issues, and topics of amusement among Iranians.
Amir-Abdollahian’s English
Iranians are mocking Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian after he tripped over basic words during a speech in English at a United Nations Security Council meeting on the situation in Gaza. The video of the speech has gone viral in Iran.
Many Iranians say they feel embarrassed by the incident. Some social media users called Amir-Abdollahian a source of disgrace on the global stage. Others joked that his area of expertise was murder rather than English. Voice of America Persian Service’s former lead presenter, Jamshid Chalangi, sarcastically pleaded with the foreign minister to have mercy and not slaughter the English language. Chalangi was alluding to Iran’s recent execution of political prisoners, which occurred as the foreign minister was welcomed in New York for his UN speech. Khalilullah Baluchi, an ethnic Baluch activist, compared Amir-Abdollahian’s English fluency with that of an elderly street vendor from the impoverished, Sunni-dominated Sistan and Baluchestan Province. However, hardline supporters of the regime have defended Amir-Abdollahian, saying that a foreign minister should not necessarily be judged by his knowledge of foreign languages.
Why it matters. In the Islamic Republic’s personnel decisions, loyalty to the regime trumps professionalism. This is what Iranians are implying on social media when they make fun of its top diplomat: that the only people who can climb the socioeconomic ladder are flatterers and lackeys. Amir-Abdollahian has ascended quickly through the ranks of the Iranian political elite, having been an affiliate of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Iranians see this as evidence of his fealty to the regime rather than his competence as a foreign minister.
Beyt Update
News about the Beyt, the Arabic word for house, which refers to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s office and official residence.
Khamenei’s Mar-a-Lago: “The King’s Garden”
Ali Khamenei, the 84-year-old supreme leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, is from Mashhad, Iran’s second-largest holy city, in the northeastern province of Khorasan. Every year, Khamenei returns to Mashhad for Nowruz, Iran’s new year celebration, which starts on March 21 and lasts almost two weeks. During Nowruz, he resides in the Bagh-e Malek (meaning “king’s garden”), the location of a palace that formerly belonged to Iran’s last king, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.
Most members of Khamenei’s extended family have parted ways with him due to political differences. Those relatives who have not cut ties with the supreme leader visit him at the King’s Garden each Nowruz. A Russian S-300 advanced surface-to-air missile defense system is reportedly stationed in Mashhad for Khamenei’s protection.
Why it matters. Iranian state media works hard to depict the supreme leader as a humble, personable, and accessible leader who should serve as a fatherly role model for citizens. In truth, however, Iranians do not buy it. Khamenei spends his yearly holiday in seclusion at an expropriated residence still known as the King’s Garden, protected by Russian air defense systems, with relatives who are clearly forced to act like a happy family for the cameras.
In this newsletter from Hudson’s Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East, Research Fellow Ahmad Hashemi gives a look beyond the mainstream discourse on Iran. For the latest important and revealing developments from the country, subscribe here.
Resistance Axis
News about the Iran-led proxy network in the Middle East that Tehran calls the “Resistance Axis.”
Cheap Houthi Drones Challenge America
Tehran-affiliated Kavosh Media highlighted that Houthi drones and missiles—built using technologies from Iran, Russia, and China for as little as $2,000 per munition—continue to cause the United States to expend million-dollar interceptors.
Why it matters. As the US spends millions unsuccessfully trying to counter the Houthis, America’s status as a global superpower erodes and the status of Iran’s proxy groups rises.
President Joe Biden has admitted that the airstrikes he authorized will not stop the Houthi attacks. But instead of deterring the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Biden administration held secret talks with Iranian leaders in Oman.
Critics say that the administration, which delisted the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization in February 2021, is emboldening the Houthis and appeasing Iran.
Hajji Washington
Developments in Iran-US relations. In 1889, Iran appointed Hajji Hossein-Gholi Khan Noori, also known as Hajji Washington, to be its first ambassador to the United States.
Iran Meddles in US Politics
Iran has joined Russia and China in celebrating the chaos on America’s southern border. Iranian media is discussing a possible civil war, the secession of Texas, and the large number of foreign nationals entering the US illegally.
Semiofficial Mehr News asked, “Will Texas Secede? The Shadow of the Civil War in America.”
IRGC-affiliated Fars News used the headline “Crisis in Texas: Civil War Has Frightened Americans.”
Islamic Republic News Agency used a similar title: “Texas Official Does Not Rule Out the Possibility of a ‘Civil War’ over Immigration Disputes.”
Why it matters. Iran is deeply concerned about separatist tendencies among its oppressed non-Persian population but welcomes such movements elsewhere.
When Tehran sees rifts in its enemies’ domestic politics, it does not hesitate to engage in espionage, sabotage, and disinformation, as it did during the 2020 US presidential election.
Love Triangle
Issues pertaining to the alliance of convenience among Ali Khamenei’s Iran, Xi Jinping’s China, and Vladimir Putin’s Russia.
The Taliban and the Triangle Alliance
Iranian, Chinese, and Russian initiatives to improve relations with the Taliban are entering a new phase, argues pro-regime news organization Iranian Diplomacy.
The article observes that chaos in the wake of America’s withdrawal pushed Afghanistan further under the influence of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a development that also serves Moscow and Tehran.
Why it matters. America’s three archenemies are filling the vacuum in resource-rich Afghanistan.
Iran vs. Aniran
Developments in Tehran’s relations with Aniran, the ethnolinguistic slur Iranians use to describe non-Iranian peoples—mainly Turks and Arabs—who live in and around the Islamic Republic.
Turkey Chokes Iran
Turkey poses a multi-pronged threat to Iran according to the International Peace Studies Center (IPSC),a private Iranian think tank.
A new report from the think tank observes that Turkey’s trade with Israel tops $7 billion annually and that Turkey is Azerbaijan’s main route to supply Israel with energy. The report alleges that Ankara is trying to unify the Turkic world and separate Iranian Azerbaijan from Tehran. Additionally, the author sees Turkey’s aspirations to create a corridor between itself and Azerbaijan as a nefarious anti-Iranian plot.
“Turkey is the source of Iran’s geopolitical suffocation,” the report explains.
Why it matters. Iran sees Turkey and Azerbaijan as its greatest adversaries. If the US was more aware of Tehran’s fears, it could contain Iran without having to commit troops or resources in the region by empowering Ankara and Baku.
The Streets of Tehran
The most debated news, issues, and topics of amusement among Iranians.
Record Low Voter Turnout in Iranian Election
Iran’s March 1 parliamentary elections had a record low voter turnout. Many Iranians boycotted the vote, the first such election since the Mahsa Amini uprising in 2022.
In a statement after the election, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei lauded the 41 percent turnout as “epic.” But social media users shared a 2001 video in which Khamenei calls Western nations’ low turnout rates “a cause of shame” and alleges that Western citizens do not trust their political systems.
Why it matters. Regime critics viewed this election as a referendum on the future of the Islamic Republic. Low turnout, they say, demonstrates the supreme leader’s illegitimacy.
In the event of 84-year-old Khamenei’s death, this perception of illegitimacy will be important. Observers should expect a substantial change in the domestic political landscape and Iranian foreign policy. With the regime’s popularity at an all-time low, the selection of a new undemocratic and authoritarian leader could cause a regime collapse.
Beyt Update
News about the Beyt, the Arabic word for house, which refers to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s office and official residence.
The Next Leader’s Name Is Confidential for Fear of Assassination.
A regime representative stated on February 26 that the next supreme leader has already been determined, but added that the name of the future leader is “confidential.” Another official added that “if we reveal the identity of the next leader, he will be assassinated.”
Why it matters. Statements like this show that succession is on the agenda in Iran. But this senior Iranian official also admits that Israeli agents can operate inside the Islamic Republic.
Israel has reportedly eliminated key figures including Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, the father of Iran’s nuclear and missile program, and Abu Muhammad al-Masri, a senior al Qaeda official residing in Tehran.
Iran’s paranoia toward Israel and the Mossad has only grown since October 7. The regime reportedly executed a 24-year-old law student and advisor to the supreme leader’s office named Mohsen Saravani on charges of spying for Israel.
Iran and Israel
The latest on the ongoing 40-year shadow war between the Islamic Republic and the Jewish state.
Anti-Israel Adult Actress Travels to Iran
American adult film actress Whitney Wright visited Iran in early February. Although she could have been sentenced to death for her profession, Wright’s anti-Israel views qualified her for an Iranian tourist visa. Wright has been accused of promoting propaganda for Iran.
Why it matters. The Iranian regime is ideological. But it is also pragmatic. It will issue a visa for an adult film star as long as she is also an anti-Israeli propagandist.
Wright is not the first adult film actress to visit Iran. But she is the first since the 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom protests against police brutality and misogyny in Iran.
Though the clerics turned a blind eye, many Iranians believe that Wright was the Iranian government’s guest.
I shared my thoughts on Mohammad Mokhber’s interim presidency @ The Epoch Times:
Who Is Mohammad Mokhber, Iran’s Interim President?
His career has included managerial positions within Ayotollah Ali Khamenei’s business empire.
Who Is Mohammad Mokhber, Iran’s Interim President?
By Jackson Richman
5/21/2024
Updated:
5/21/2024
With the May 19 death of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, Mohammad Mokhber became the interim president of the Islamic Republic.
In accordance with Iran’s constitution, there will be elections within 50 days.
However, whether Mr. Mokhber, 68, will have the interim label removed as Iran’s election is to be determined and far from guaranteed.
The Iranian presidency is a four-year term with a consecutive two-term limit.
Gabriel Noronha, who worked on Iran policy in the Trump administration, told The Epoch Times: “He is a caretaker—the election to succeed Raisi has been scheduled for a month from now.
“He isn’t necessarily positioned to win that role, typically his job is more to manage operations inside the government.”
Iranian President Raisi to Visit China to Shore Up Ties
Ilan Berman, senior vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council, which is in Washington, echoed Mr. Noronha.
“He does not have any other mandate but to stay the course, and continue pursuing the policies authorized by the Supreme Leader and put in place by Raisi,” Mr. Berman told The Epoch Times.
However, he said, Mr. Mokhber could make the case to succeed Mr. Raisi on a permanent basis if he remains loyal to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who essentially has the ultimate say in who will be the successor.
Another possible candidate to replace Mr. Raisi is Mohammad Ghalibaf, the speaker of Iran’s parliament.
Unlike Mr. Mokhber, Mr. Ghalibaf has not been sanctioned by the United States.
Previously, Mr. Mokhber was the seventh First Vice President of Iran (Iran has 12 vice presidents). He was appointed by Mr. Raisi to the position on Aug. 8, 2021.
“He has spent most of his career in managerial positions within Ali Khamenei’s business empire and as a close adviser to him and his office,” said Saeed Ghasseminejad, an Iran expert at Washington think tank the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, to The Epoch Times.
“We will see a continuation of previous policies and total submission of the executive branch to the supreme leader and orders coming from his office.”
“Raisi was known for his ultra-Islamist and fanatical views on religion, society, politics and countering dissent, but Mokhber is not as zealot,” Ahmad Hashemi, a research fellow at the Washington-based Hudson Institute, told The Epoch Times.
But “there will be more continuity than change. Strategic decisions are made by the supreme leader. The president is an implementer,” Jason Brodsky, policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran, told The Epoch Times.
Mr. Mokhber ran Mr. Khamenei’s hedge fund Setad, or EIKO, and his conglomerate Bonyad Mostazafan.
The United States sanctioned the former entity on Nov. 18, 2020, and the latter on Jan. 13, 2021, when Washington also sanctioned Mr. Mokhber—just seven days before President Joe Biden took office.
But, noted Mr. Berman: “Mokhber has a comparatively lower profile. He is still an insider—before assuming the role of acting president, he was Iran’s first vice president.
“However, he doesn’t have either the notoriety or the stigma that Raisi did.”
Mr. Raisi, who was sanctioned by the United States in 2019, was known as the “Butcher of Tehran” for ordering the executions of thousands of Iranians in 1988.
Nonetheless, said Mr. Ghasseminejad: “Mokhber is corrupt and played a key role in Tehran’s disastrous response to the COVID pandemic,” where there were well over 100,000 deaths from the virus.
“He forced Iranians to use a vaccine developed by one of the subsidiaries of Khamenei’s business empire, run by Mokhber himself, by obtaining an order from Khamenei that banned the import of vaccines developed in the West,” he said.
While the president of Iran is a notable position as the highest-elected position in Iran, the ultimate succession to look out for is who will be the next ayatollah after Mr. Khamenei, 85, dies or were he to resign.
Mr. Raisi was seen as Mr. Khamenei’s successor but now it is uncertain who will lead the regime, though it could be Mr. Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba Khamenei.
“Now that [Mr. Raisi] is no longer in the picture, there will be a great deal of activity on the part of the Iranian regime to solidify and clarify succession for the country’s top post,” said Mr. Berman.
Mr. Mojtaba Khamenei, who was sanctioned by the United States in 2019, leads the Basij, a paramilitary unit of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Cops, which is a U.S.-designated terrorist group.
However, the aftermath of Mr. Raisi’s death could make the regime vulnerable and inspire further protests by dissenters.
“As Iran has declared five days of mourning in memory of President Ebrahim Raisi, the regime is concerned about the likelihood that masses may take into streets to celebrate Raisi’s death in coming days or interrupt his official mourning processions when the regime tries to display to the world an optics of a solidarity, union, and popularity in the face of this tragedy,” said Mr. Hashemi.
In this newsletter from Hudson’s Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East, Research Fellow Ahmad Hashemi gives a look beyond the mainstream discourse on Iran. For the latest important and revealing developments from the country, subscribe here.
Resistance Axis
News about Iran’s proxy network in the Middle East.
Iran Equips Surrogates with Its Latest Technologies
Iran’s investment in a robust military industrial complex is paying off. The Islamic Republic’s proxy wars are increasingly tech-savvy and decreasingly labor-intensive for Tehran.
At the Doha International Maritime Defense Exhibition (DIMDEX), Iran showcased naval weapons and full-sized models of unmanned aerial vehicles, including one named “Gaza.” Additionally, the Houthis claim to have a hypersonic cruise missile.
Why it matters. The United States and its allies’ reluctance to retaliate to Iran’s attacks has emboldened Tehran and validated its strategy of maintaining plausible deniability while arming proxies with increasingly sophisticated weapons.
Hajji Washington
Developments in Iran-US relations.
Iran Exports “Death to America” Chants
Thanks to Iran’s information warfare, Chicagoans do not need to leave home to hear “death to America and death to Israel” chants. A group of purported anti-war activists chanted this slogan in Farsi at the Teamsters Union’s Chicago headquarters, led by an organizer whom the Daily Caller identified as Shabbir Rizvi.
Why it matters. Shabbir Rizvi is an Iranian regime supporter and Hamas sympathizer who poses as a peace activist. He has appeared on Iran’s English-language television network, Press TV, as a political analyst and has published numerous anti-Israel op-eds.
Middle Easterners view people chanting anti-American slogans on US soil as a sign of America’s weakness. Though the Iranian government is a pariah in the West, these protests demonstrate that Tehran has managed to expand its network of influence.
Love Triangle
On the alliance among Ali Khamenei’s Iran, Xi Jinping’s China, and Vladimir Putin’s Russia.
Iran, Russia, and China’s Joint Naval Drill
China, Iran, and Russia held a joint naval drill, Marine Security Belt 2024, in the Gulf of Oman, a crucial waterway near the mouth of the Persian Gulf.
Why it matters. US Central Command leader General Michael Kurilla sounded the alarm to lawmakers about Iran’s tightening of its ties with Russia and China. He told a House Armed Services Committee hearing that “Iran is reliant on China, and Russia is reliant on Iran.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg also warned in April that autocratic regimes are forming an “axis of evil” to challenge Western democracies.
Iran and Israel
The latest on the shadow war between the Islamic Republic and the Jewish state.
Iran Is Paranoid about Mossad’s Involvement in Baluchistan
As Iran struggles to control its eastern borders, conspiracy theories about Mossad’s involvement in ethnic riots are spreading in Tehran.
Iran’s Sistan and Baluchistan Province is the most impoverished region in the country, mostly because the Baluch people are Sunni and non-Persian. Iran’s systemic discrimination against the Baluch has given rise to numerous militant separatist groups in the province.
Jaish al-Adl, one Baluch separatist group, occasionally attacks Iran’s security forces. On April 4, the Iranian media reported a series of attacks. The militants claimed they targeted six regime outposts. During these clashes, dozens of Iranian Army and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) troops were killed.
Why it matters. Iran has succeeded in expanding its influence in the region but still cannot stabilize its borders. Tehran labels Sunni Baluch separatist groups as “Zionist conspirators” and describes the Baluch as “foreign nationals” and “non-Iranians.”
Even Iranian opposition groups have unfavorable views of the Baluch. US-based former political prisoner and Milton Friedman Prize winner Akbar Ganji claimed that the Baluch militants who engaged in clashes with Iranian forces are Mossad mercenaries.
Iran vs. Aniran
Tehran’s relations with non-Iranian peoples in and around the Islamic Republic.
Iranians Claim That Israel’s Embassy in Azerbaijan Is a Legitimate Target
Iran promised a response to a suspected Israeli missile attack that destroyed Iran’s consulate in the Syrian capital of Damascus and killed seven people, including a top IRGC commander. In the aftermath of the attack, Iran-affiliated social media accounts advocated striking Israel’s diplomatic missions in the region, including in Azerbaijan.
Member of Iranian Parliament Rashidi Kuchi suggested that Iran should “openly and directly target one of the diplomatic centers of the Zionists in one of the countries of the region, preferably Azerbaijan.”
Why it matters. Iran is suspicious of its neighbors who maintain cordial ties with Israel. October 7 was, among other things, a move to stop normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia.
Iran is alarmed by the Azerbaijan-Israel friendship and wants nothing more than to sabotage it. But Tehran is also concerned about potential backlash from Iranian Azerbaijanis if the IRGC fires missiles at Baku. An Azerbaijani activist warned that an attack on the Israeli embassy in Azerbaijan would exacerbate tensions between Azerbaijani Turks and Persians in Iran.
In Iran’s political literature, and among Persian nationalists in particular, a “Turk-o-Fars war”—a confrontation between Azerbaijani Turks and Persians—is a taboo term and a situation that the regime needs to avoid at all costs.
The Streets of Tehran
The most debated news, issues, and topics of amusement among Iranians.
The Iran-Israel Aerial Confrontation Changed the Equation
Iranians hold differing opinions about the significance of Iran-Israel strikes and counterstrikes. Alam Saleh, a professor of political science at the Australian National University, believes that Iran’s daring strike shows that Tehran is a nuclear threshold country. Iran’s attack suggests that the decision to build nuclear weapons is political, not a matter of Tehran’s technical capability, Saleh argued.
Hooshang Amirahmadi of Rutgers University said that Iran must take an “eye for an eye” approach: Iran must hit an Israeli consulate as a proportional response. He also said that “Iran should not worry about the US reaction. The US cannot do a damn thing.”
US-based political activist Mehdi Jalali argued that the attack revealed that Israel’s military might is a myth. He claimed that Israel’s weak and insufficient retaliation dealt an even bigger blow to Israel’s deterrence.
Why it matters. Perception and deterrence matter. Though Iran failed to inflict major pain on Israel with hundreds of drones and missiles on April 13, many Iranians believe that Israel’s air superiority and near-invincibility are no longer certain.
Beyt Update
News from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s office and official residence.
Smash the Head of the Snake!
Reactions to Israel’s retaliation to Iran’s strike were mixed. Some Iranians welcomed an Israeli counterattack, posting messages like, “Israel! Smash the snake’s head!” Others urged Israel to “strike at the Beyt!” One user said Iranians need “to launch a massive online campaign and urge Israel to directly strike the supreme leader’s office.” A graffiti artist wrote, “Israel! Attack Iran and we will pour into the streets!” Another asked Israel to return the historic favor: “Cyrus the Great saved the Jews [in Babylon] and now it is time for Israel [to return the favor by striking the Mullah regime in Iran].”
There were rumors that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and senior IRGC commanders had gone into hiding in expectation of Israel’s retaliation. Kayhan London stated that Khamenei had fallen into an Israeli trap, implying that the supreme leader was anxious about the response to his attack.
Why it matters. Despite the regime’s antisemitic propaganda, Iranians are distrustful of their government’s anti-Israel rhetoric. Some Iranians are among the most pro-Israel people in the region. Public expression of pro-Israeli sentiments is dangerous, but many managed to break their silence on anonymous social media accounts.
Domestic dissent in the face of a potential war with Israel scares the mullahs. Citing a source in Iran, the US-based Persian-language website IranWire revealed that Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence recently held special meetings aimed at studying the likelihood of “riots” in the event of a potential Israeli attack on Iran.
