05 November, 2025

Implications of TRIPP in the South Caucuses | GPI

  

Implications of TRIPP in the South Caucasus| GPI

My Conversation with BAU University Students on the Significance of TRIPP

I recently spoke to BAU University students about the significance of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) for the region and beyond, and the presentation outlines are included below:

🌍 The Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) Corridor

The Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) transit corridor is a geopolitically and economically vital project stemming from a US-brokered peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, signed following a White House meeting on August 8, 2025. This deal aims to finally resolve the decades-long Karabakh conflict. The core of TRIPP is a land connection linking mainland Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenian territory, for which the US has secured exclusive development rights under a 99-year lease.

📈 Economic and Strategic Significance

Economically, TRIPP is crucial, as it will incorporate rail, road, energy, and fiber optic lines. This infrastructure creates a shorter, more direct East-West transit route along the Middle Corridor (Trans-Caspian International Transport Route or TITR). It significantly links Turkey and the Caspian Sea, while strategically bypassing the territories of both Russia and Iran. This direct connection positions TRIPP as a key component in the broader Great Power Competition for international influence, trade, and strategic dominance across Eurasia.

🗺️ The South Caucasus: A Geopolitical Crossroads

The South Caucasus, encompassing the independent nations of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, is geographically positioned between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, historically serving as a natural boundary between Eastern Europe and Western Asia. This region has always been a diverse, complex, and contested crossroads. Its modern geopolitical relevance is deeply rooted in its history, marked by centuries of control by various empires, including the Turkic-Persian empires and, later, the conquest by Imperial Russia in the 19th century.

🕰️ Historical Tensions and the Soviet Legacy

Following the Russian conquest, the South Caucasus remained under the centralized control of the Soviet Union until 1991. The Soviet policy often employed a strategy of “divide and rule,” including the deliberate gerrymandering of administrative borders. A key example is the placement of the Nagorno-Karabakh region within the Azerbaijan SSR, and the granting of the Zangezur region (now Syunik Province in southern Armenia) to the Armenian SSR under Stalin—policies designed to create potential “frozen conflicts” and maintain central control.

💥 Post-Soviet Conflicts and Instability

The collapse of the USSR in 1991 unleashed powerful nationalist movements, leading to the independence of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, but also resulting in devastating conflicts. These included the First Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988–1994), which left the region a “frozen conflict,” and Georgian separatist wars in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This instability allowed Russia to maintain leverage as the self-proclaimed regional security guarantor. The region’s geopolitical landscape was fundamentally reshaped by the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, which saw Azerbaijan reclaim significant territory.

🌐 Geopolitical Importance of Connectivity

TRIPP matters because the Caucasus and Central Asia matter. Geopolitical theories, such as Halford Mackinder’s “Heartland Theory” and Zbigniew Brzezinski’s analysis, underscore Eurasia’s strategic value, with Central Asia as the pivotal “Heartland” and Azerbaijan as the “cork in the bottle.” For millennia, controlling the Silk Road meant controlling the region’s wealth and influence. TRIPP, by establishing a crucial new corridor, is integral to the modern “New Great Game,” linking the landlocked Central Asian states and their resources to the global markets via the West, thus challenging the traditional routes controlled by Russia and Iran.

🇺🇸 Winners: The US, Turkey, and Azerbaijan

The successful implementation of TRIPP has major winners. The United States gains a foothold in a key region, strengthening its commitment to the Middle Corridor as an alternative trade and energy route, thereby reducing dependency on Russia and Iran. Turkey stands to benefit significantly by advancing its commercial and political influence within the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). Azerbaijan enhances its position as a connectivity hub, strengthening its alliances and strategic importance.

🚫 Losers: Russia and Iran

The primary losers of the TRIPP corridor are Russia and Iran, who both prefer North-South connectivity over the East-West route championed by the US and Turkey. TRIPP directly challenges Iran due to its fears of “Turan convergence” (the growing cohesion of Turkic states) and the potential loss of substantial transit revenue. Russia sees TRIPP as a diminishing of its traditional role as the exclusive power broker in the South Caucasus, a move that further pushes Central Asian states away from its control and challenges its “Near Abroad” doctrine.

🚧 Challenges to TRIPP’s Success

The full realization of TRIPP and a lasting peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan is contingent on overcoming several significant challenges. These include President Trump’s continued interest and focus beyond mere “photo opportunities,” as well as the domestic survival of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Pashinyan’s conciliatory efforts face strong opposition from pro-Russia and “old guard” forces in Armenia who view his concessions as betrayal. Furthermore, the influential Armenian lobby in the US and France actively seeks to obstruct policies seen as beneficial to Azerbaijan, posing a major political challenge.

🚀 The Path Forward

The White House-brokered TRIPP initiative is a crucial opportunity for increased US engagement in the South Caucasus and Eurasia to counter the influence of major rivals. To ensure TRIPP’s success and the full fruition of the peace plan, the US needs a robust, long-term Central Asia strategy. This strategy should focus on expanding diplomatic presence, fostering cooperation to bring Armenia closer to the Euro-Atlantic community, and pursuing ambitious regional strategies like advocating for the trans-Caspian natural gas pipeline and building institutional relationships with the Organization of Turkic States (OTS).


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22 September, 2025

Ahmad Hashemi confronts the Iranian regime’s post-conflict recalibration

Ahmad Hashemi confronts the Iranian regime’s post-conflict recalibration

 The upcoming The Washington Outsider hashtag#Report on The Coalition – Talk Radio interview with Ahmad Hashemi confronts the Iranian regime’s post-conflict recalibration—both at home and across its regional footprint. The discussion delivers a sharp dissection of Iran’s unraveling regional posture in the wake of its direct confrontation with Israel and the cascading diplomatic fallout.

The interview opens with Australia’s decisive expulsion of Iran’s diplo-terrorists—a portmanteau now gaining traction to describe Tehran’s weaponization of diplomatic cover for covert operations. This move signals a broader shift in Canberra’s counter-interference doctrine, positioning Australia as a frontline democracy confronting transnational antisemitism and proxy intimidation.

The conversation then pivots to the global reverberations of the snapback sanctions, which have re-isolated Iran economically and politically. The regime’s attempts to frame its missile strikes on Israeli civilians as legitimate resistance are dismantled, with reference to Human Rights Watch’s rare rebuke—despite its historic anti-Israeli bias—labeling the attacks as likely war crimes. This moment marks a rupture in Tehran’s ability to manipulate international human rights discourse to shield its aggression.

Attention turns to the South Caucasus, where Iran finds itself strategically sidelined by President Trump’s participation in the Azerbaijan–Armenia peace deal and the proposed Zangezur corridor. The corridor, linking the Caspian and Black Seas, threatens to bypass Iran entirely, undermining its leverage over regional trade and transit. The interview explores how Tehran’s exclusion from this infrastructure realignment exposes its diminishing influence and deepens its strategic isolation. The corridor’s potential to foster economic interdependence between Armenia and Azerbaijan—while aligning with Western and Turkish interests—further marginalizes Iran’s role.

Throughout the program, the conversation examines how Tehran’s information warfare strategy is adapting to these setbacks. With its regional proxies under pressure and its diplomatic credibility eroding, Iran is recalibrating its propaganda apparatus to deflect blame and project strength. Yet the cracks are visible: from missile miscalculations to diplomatic expulsions, the regime’s projection strategy is faltering under the weight of its own contradictions.

This interview is not just a geopolitical postmortem—it’s a real-time autopsy of a regime losing its grip on the narrative, the region, and its relevance. But are these losses enough to bring about the collapse of the Islamic Republic – or will faltering international policies, and assistance from China, Russia, and North Korea, salvage the regime from the brink?

Iran’s War on Its Jewry in the Aftermath of a Conflict with Israel

 Middle East Forum Observer

Iran’s War on Its Jewry in the Aftermath of a Conflict with Israel

Jews in Iran Face Discriminatory Laws, but the Regime Also Exploits Them for Propaganda and as a Tool to Vilify Israel

A Jewish water pipe seller reads the Torah in his shop in the Shiraz bazaar.

Shutterstock

In the aftermath of its Twelve-Day War with Israel in June 2025, Iran’s clerical regime has arrested hundreds of citizens accused of spying for Israel. Not all those arrested were Jewish, but Iran’s small, dwindling Jewish community has become a scapegoat. State-controlled media have accused Jewish Iranians, along with other religious and ethnic minorities, of being “Mossad mercenaries.”

Security agencies have arrested several prominent members of the Jewish community, including rabbis and cantors.

While Iran’s Jews already face discriminatory laws, the escalation with Israel has worsened their situation. They are now subject to increased surveillance, intimidation, and pressure. Iranian authorities reportedly have summoned and interrogated at least 35 Jewish citizens in Tehran and Shiraz, demanding information about their contacts with relatives in Israel.

Security agencies have arrested several prominent members of the Jewish community, including rabbis and cantors. Authorities also have conducted raids on the homes of dozens of Jewish community members. During these raids, they confiscated and checked cell phones for records of calls to Israel.

Tehran’s treatment of its Jewish population is paradoxical. On one hand, the regime brutalizes them as spies for Israel, and on the other, it exploits them for anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli propaganda and as a tool to vilify Israel. For example, Homayoun Sameyah, the Jewish representative in the Iranian parliament, has claimed that Israel’s attacks on Iran destroyed homes belonging to Iranian Jews.

In another instance, security forces allegedly forced the Anjoman-e Kalimiyan-e Iran, the official representative body of the Jewish community in Iran, to send threatening text messages to its members warning that any contact with people outside the country is “forbidden” and that community members are responsible for any social media activities, including comments, reposts, or likes related to the Twelve-Day War.

According to various reports, following Israeli strikes on Iran’s military and nuclear sites, the Islamic Republic has forced some rabbis and Jewish conscripts to participate in anti-Israel rallies, including at a rally held in Tehran’s Abrishami Synagogue, while wearing their military uniforms and kippahs. The regime also has forced them to attend public displays of loyalty to the Islamic Republic and its supreme leader, Ali Khamenei.

In using antisemitic tropes such as Jewish power and control, some Iranian officials and religious figures have even claimed that Israel has control over supernatural forces.

The twelve-day conflict with Israel has fueled a surge in antisemitism in Iran and bolstered the regime’s apocalyptic worldview. In using antisemitic tropes such as Jewish power and control, some Iranian officials and religious figures have even claimed that Israel has control over supernatural forces, and uses “Jinns and Hebrew talismans” as weapons of war. Similarly, one Shahid Beheshti University Professor claimed “New York Jewry” orchestrated the June war. He explained that Jewish real estate interests have sway over President Donald Trump.

The belief in the Mahdi, a messianic figure Twelver Shi’a believe will return to usher in a period of just and divine Islamic rule on Earth, informs Iran’s foreign policy and its relationship with Israel and the Jewish people.

This Mahdaviat belief allows no space for Israel or Jews and leads to the apocalyptic worldview that drives the Islamic Republic’s pursuit of dominance, nuclearization, and its genocidal tendency towards non-Shi’a. Yet, despite its radical ideology, realpolitik often guides the Iranian government’s actions. While Tehran’s treatment of its Jewish population will worsen, the regime is unlikely to persecute so completely that it would spark a mass exodus, for it still benefits from its ability to use Jews as living museum exhibits to maintain a facade of diversity and tolerance to both domestic and international audiences.


Iran’s War on Its Jewry in the Aftermath of a Conflict with Israel

Some exciting personal news

 

Some exciting personal news: I’ve joined the Global Policy Institute (GPI) in Washington, D.C., as the Director of the Middle East and Central Asia Program.
I’m incredibly excited about this opportunity to contribute to a team focused on critical policy issues. This role will allow me to engage in meaningful research and policy analysis on the Middle East and Central Asia, and I look forward to making a significant impact. I’m excited to start my new role!

https://globalpi.org/person/ahmad-hashemi/

11 August, 2025

Iran shouldn’t count on China to boost its air force

 My latest for The Hill:

Iran shouldn’t count on China to boost its air force
by Ahmad Hashemi, opinion contributor - 08/08/25 10:00 AM ET
The 12-day Israeli air campaign in June was a test of technological dominance. It was a quick and massive victory for Israel and for the U.S. The war severely crippled Iran’s military, exposing critical weaknesses in its air defenses and aging air force.
Iran’s fleet of Cold War-era jets was no match for Israeli stealth fighters, allowing Israel to quickly achieve air superiority. This dominance enabled Jerusalem to decimate Iran’s military leadership and destroy key nuclear and military sites.
In response to these vulnerabilities, Tehran is now planning to acquire Chinese J-10C fighter jets to modernize its air force and reassert control over its airspace.
The Iran-Israel war also tested the limits of Iran’s alliance with Russia, which offered little more than diplomatic support to Tehran during the conflict. Despite a recently signed strategic partnership agreement and years of close cooperation, Russia’s support for Iran during this crisis has proven largely rhetorical.
Russian President Vladimir Putin condemned the U.S. attacks, describing them as “unjustified.” Putin called for dialogue without offering any military aid, claiming that Israel is almost a Russian-speaking country, much to the dismay of Iran.
Russia’s failure to deliver on a 2023 agreement for Su-35 jets and its wavering commitment to help Iran during the Iran-Israel war have led Iran to openly question Russia’s reliability as an ally.
Consequently, Tehran is now turning to China for advanced military hardware that Russia failed to provide. Iran’s weapons procurement talks with Beijing, therefore, mark a subtle but profound shift away from Moscow’s aerospace orbit, signaling a significant shift in Iran’s strategic partnerships and potentially impacting the fragile strategic balance in the region.
Iran is in high-level discussions with China to acquire up to 40 Chengdu J-10C multirole fighter jets, along with advanced air defense systems.
The J-10C — sometimes called the “Rafale Killer” after its successful engagement against French-made Indian Rafale jets in a 2025 India-Pakistan conflict — could significantly alter the regional balance of power in Iran’s favor to the detriment of Israel and Arab Gulf states.
This acquisition would be a major step in modernizing Iran’s air force, bridging the technological gap with its rivals, and potentially deterring future Israeli strikes.
Such a deal would also solidify China’s growing influence as a defense supplier in the Middle East and deepen its strategic partnership with Iran. Acquiring the J-10C jets could trigger a regional arms race, with other countries seeking to modernize their air forces to counter Iran’s new capabilities.
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other Arab Gulf neighbors are concerned about the potential transfer of Chinese jets to Iran, but Israel is worried the most. Israel is closely watching these developments and is concerned that Iran’s acquisition of these advanced jets could deter future Israeli strikes and bolster Iran’s ability to defend its airspace.
Israel seeks to halt the fighter jet deal between China and Iran. A successful deal would also cement China’s position as a major arms provider to Iran, further strengthening their strategic partnership.
Iran views the Chinese J-10C jets as a key to modernizing its almost nonexistent air force and countering Israel’s air superiority. If Iran succeeds in striking a deal, this will mark a clear strategic pivot toward China for military hardware.
Currently, China appears to be the only nation willing to supply Iran with advanced weaponry. However, Beijing is proceeding cautiously due to several factors. Past attempts by Iran to acquire J-10Cs in 2015 were thwarted by a United Nations arms embargo and China’s demand for cash payments over Iran’s proposed oil-and-gas barter.
In addition, China’s reluctance to fully commit to large-scale arms exports to Iran is rooted in its desire to avoid Western backlash and its complex relations with Iran’s regional rivals, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. These Gulf states are crucial energy suppliers and trading partners for China.
Furthermore, China prioritizes stabilizing its relationship with Washington to focus on its own technological and economic self-sufficiency, which is a more critical goal than the potential profits from selling advanced weapons to Iran.
Despite this hesitancy regarding advanced weapons sales, China is and will remain a vital ally for Iran through continued oil purchases in violation of international sanctions. More than 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports go to China, providing a crucial financial lifeline to the sanctions-stricken nation.
The arms deal is far from certain. For China, maintaining access to the Gulf’s energy resources and ensuring regional stability outweigh the benefits of supplying Iran with advanced weaponry. If unable to acquire Chinese fighter jets, Iran would be susceptible to recurring Israeli air strikes, hindering its ability to enhance its ballistic, drone, and nuclear capabilities.
The stakes are high for inaction. Washington possesses several leverages against Beijing. The U.S. is a major export market for China and contributes significantly to its GDP growth. America must use this leverage to prevent China’s potential weapons sale to Iran.
Ahmad Hashemi is a research fellow at the Hudson Institute.
Tags: Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran China, Foreign relations of Iran, Iran, Iran-Israeli tensions, Israel, J-10C fighter jets, Russia, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, United States, Vladimir Puti,n Vladimir Putin