Iran’s ‘North Korea moment’ might happen via smaller, covert nuclear sites
Unable to compete with the military superiority of Israel and the United States, Tehran now has more reasons to build bombs, not less.
Ahmad Hashemi
Ahmad Hashemi is a research fellow at the Hudson Institute.
(July 9, 2025 / JNS)
Israel’s 12-day war, followed by U.S. President Donald Trump’s historic decision to launch American strikes against Iran’s nuclear sites, struck a significant blow to Iran’s nuclear proliferation efforts.
Having lost its skies to Israel, Iran has become vulnerable to arbitrary Israeli airstrikes and might feel the urgency to double down on advancing its nuclear program. Iran’s nuclear capabilities have been crushed as a result of last month’s war, but the regime’s desire for a nuclear bomb persists. Iran has spent billions of dollars and decades of effort on its nuclear program and cannot give up on it. The only option left to survive is to build nuclear bombs.
Unable to compete with the military superiority of Israel and the United States, Tehran now has more reasons to build bombs, not less. While its progress has been dealt a significant blow, it doesn’t have to start from scratch. Its scientists retain their technical know-how, and the regime has the capability to rebuild its program over time, especially if it chooses to go dark and secretive.
Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, 86, is an avid reader of history. He knows well what happened to Ukraine, Libya, Iraq and Syria when they were forced to give up on their nuclear ambitions or, in the case of Ukraine, when it surrendered its nuclear weapons. Before the June war, Khamenei pursued a policy of strategic patience, trying to wait out Trump’s second term while looking for a perfect time to declare its “North Korea moment.” However, now that his regime’s survival is under question and he is hiding in an unspecified underground bunker out of fear for his life, he might decide to go for the nuclear option.
The Iranian regime may also have taken steps to remove equipment and material from its enrichment facilities before the American attacks against three nuclear facilities: Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan. If Iran still has access to some of its stockpile of more than 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium—uranium enriched to 60%, which is weapon usable—then direct use of that material may suddenly appear to its leaders as the most attractive and fastest pathway to a bomb.
Given that Iran’s major sites have been damaged—if not fully destroyed—it may turn to smaller-sized and more secretive, diversified and dispersed nuclear programs to defy air campaigns. There are some legitimate concerns about whether it already has covert weaponization research and enrichment sites. Further, Iran had announced in early June that it had built and would activate a third enrichment site. This would make it much more difficult to detect Iran’s future nuclear program because Tehran could try to rebuild covertly, especially if it decides not to cooperate with inspectors associated with the U.N. nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Iran’s parliament approved a bill on June 25 to suspend cooperation with the IAEA. A week later, on July 2, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian ratified the legislation.
If Iran were to follow North Korea’s example and begin to produce nuclear weapons, with or without withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the nuclear domino effect would be felt in the region and beyond. Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey would follow suit.
A nuclear Iran would be an existential threat to Israel. A nuclear Iran would be the end of NPT and other nonproliferation arrangements. Arab states, led by Egypt, have long complained that Israel remains outside the NPT treaty and have decried what they consider a “double standard” in the treatment of Israel’s nuclear program. A nuclear Iran would give the Arab states an excuse to go nuclear.
The implications of this nuclear arms race would not be limited to the Middle East. Japan and South Korea might try to acquire nuclear weapons to deter North Korea.
The stakes are high for inaction. If they notice any sign of nuclear activities in Iran, the United States and Israel would need to resume airstrikes to prevent Iran from rebuilding its capabilities for producing nuclear weapons, especially before Iran can restore its shattered aerial defenses. Only a full pause on enrichment and the resumption of IAEA inspectors’ activities can deny Iran a North Korea moment.
https://www.jns.org/irans-north-korea-moment-might-happen-via-smaller-covert-nuclear-sites/
https://ahmadhashemi.net/2025/07/09/irans-north-korea-moment-might-happen-via-smaller-covert-nuclear-sites/
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